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ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY
Russell D. Covey

INTRODUCTION
Jailhouse snitch testimony is arguably the single most unreliable
type of evidence currently used in criminal trials. Snitches are deeply
unreliable witnesses. Many are con artists, congenital liars, and
practiced fraudsters. As compensated witnesses, all snitches have
deep conflicts of interest. What is worse, jailhouse snitch testimony
as a class is not only the least credible type of evidence, but it is also
among the most persuasive to jurors because jailhouse informants
typically allege to have personally heard defendants confess their
guilt to the crimes charged. Introduction of a defendant’s confession,
from any source, radically changes the complexion of a case,
particularly one lacking other evidence that directly implicates the
defendant in the crime. Research studies demonstrate that jurors are
simply ill equipped to evaluate the credibility of jailhouse informant
testimony and consistently give such testimony far more weight than
is due even if they are aware of the incentives jailhouse snitches
receive or expect in exchange for their testimony. The prejudicial
effect of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony is magnified by the
context in which the evidence is presented to the jury. Jailhouse
snitches are States’ witnesses, and the credibility of their testimony
is likely substantially bolstered as a result. Prosecutors bolster
jailhouse snitch testimony simply by putting them on the witness
stand as state witnesses, signaling to the jury that the prosecutor
believes their testimony is trustworthy. Even in cases in which
bolstering crosses the line into the territory of the unethical or
improper, and it often does, prosecutors are rarely called out for their
misconduct, much less face sanctions. As a result of both implicit and
explicit prosecutorial bolstering, jailhouse snitch testimony tends to
have an even greater, and potentially more prejudicial, effect on
reliable fact-finding.
Jailhouse snitch testimony, in fact, is so likely to make a material
difference to the outcome of close cases, and so likely to be false, that
permitting such witnesses to testify, absent direct corroboration
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through electronic recording or some other similarly reliable method,
should be flatly banned. Numerous commentators have proposed
modest fixes to the jailhouse snitch problem. Some have urged the
conduct of pretrial reliability hearings. Others have argued for
enhanced disclosure obligations regarding informant background and
testimony. Still other fixes have been proposed. But given the depth
to which jailhouse testimony is compromised, these modest proposals
are simply inadequate. Anything less than total abolition of jailhouse
snitch testimony is fundamentally insufficient to address what is
perhaps the most outrageous and destructive prosecutorial practice
currently tolerated by law.
This Article lays out that argument. Following this introduction,
Part I demonstrates that jailhouse informant testimony is inherently
biased and that the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury
are overwhelming. Part II explains why jailhouse snitch testimony is
so persuasive to jurors, and why it is responsible for a
disproportionate number of wrongful convictions. Part III examines
the present devices relied upon to filter out unreliable informant
testimony—cross-examination and postconviction review—and finds
them wanting. Neither device has a successful track record of
providing relief to wrongfully convicted defendants nor offers any
realistic mechanism to screen out unreliable snitch testimony. Part
IV considers several remedies proposed by commentators and enacted
in a few jurisdictions. These remedies, if adopted, might marginally
improve the situation in some cases, but all of these remedies
ultimately fail to address the fundamental problems of unreliability
and unaccountability that are inherent to this class of evidence. Part
V then advances the main thesis of the Article, urging adoption of a
total ban on jailhouse informant testimony, subject only to a possible
exception for testimony corroborated with electronic recording of any
alleged confession or admission made by a criminal defendant. It
assesses the grounds for such a ban by examining other categorical
evidentiary exclusions enforced through judicial, legislative, or
executive action.
I. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS FUNDAMENTALLY AND
PERVASIVELY UNRELIABLE
Exoneration studies have identified a set of recurrent causes of
wrongful convictions, including false confessions, mistaken
eyewitness testimony, and faulty forensic evidence.1 However, no
evidence is more intrinsically untrustworthy than the allegations of

1. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8–9 (2011); Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the U.S., 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542–44 (2005).
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a jailhouse snitch.2 According to some wrongful conviction scholars,
jailhouse snitch testimony is the single greatest cause of wrongful
convictions.3 This should not be surprising. It is hard to imagine
more facially untrustworthy evidence.
One federal court
characterized the practice of using jailhouse snitches as “one of the
most abused aspects of the criminal justice system,”4 another as a
“fertile field[] from which truth-bending or even perjury could grow,”5
and a third called jailhouse snitch testimony “inherently unreliable.”6
In an address intended as advice for prosecutors, federal judge
Stephen Trott warned prosecutors not to trust criminal informants:
Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to
get what they want, especially when what they want
is to get out of trouble with the law. This willingness

2. See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, Jailhouse Snitch Testimony: A Policy
Review,
THE
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS
1
(2007),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustso
rg/reports/death_penalty_reform/Jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy
20briefpdf.pdf (stating that “snitch testimony is widely regarded as the
least reliable testimony encountered in the criminal justice system”); see
also Brief of the NACDL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
2, Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (No. 07-1356), 2008 WL
5409458 [hereinafter Brief of the NACDL] (“a jailhouse snitch’s
uncorroborated claim that the defendant confessed to him . . . is
notoriously unreliable.”). Similarly, a state court has cautioned that
“[c]ourts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants, especially
if there is a hint that the informant received some sort of a benefit for his
or her testimony.” Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App.
2000).
3. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice
in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 57 (1987) (reporting
that jailhouse informants testified falsely in 117 of the 350 wrongful
convictions studied).
Other exoneration studies have identified
eyewitness misidentifications and false confessions as factors in a greater
number of known wrongful convictions. GARRETT, supra note 1. Even if
mistaken eyewitness testimony and false confessions have led to a
greater absolute number of known wrongful convictions, there is little
doubt that false jailhouse snitch testimony occurs with greater frequency
than mistaken eyewitness identifications or false confessions. While
eyewitness testimony and defendant confessions are two of the most
common types of evidence used in criminal prosecutions, snitch
testimony appears in a quantitatively smaller subset of cases.
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 6 (2009). Nonetheless, it still manages to
account for a sizeable number of documented wrongful convictions.
Bedau & Radelet, supra.
4. Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 470 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Jana Winograde, Comment, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for
Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
755, 756 (1990)).
5. United States. v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2002).
6. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).
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to do anything includes not only truthfully spilling the
beans on friends and relatives, but also lying,
committing
perjury,
manufacturing
evidence,
soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more
lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come
into
contact,
including—and
especially—the
prosecutor. A drug addict can sell out his mother to
get a deal, and burglars, robbers, murderers and
thieves are not far behind. Criminals are remarkably
manipulative and skillfully devious.
Many are
outright conscienceless sociopaths to whom “truth” is
a wholly meaningless concept. To some, “conning”
people is a way of life. Others are just basically
unstable people. A “reliable informer” one day may
turn into a consummate prevaricator the next.7
Judge Trott warned that, among informants, jailhouse snitches
are indisputably the worst of the bunch:
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse
snitch who claims another prisoner has confessed to
him. The snitch now stands ready to testify in return
for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they
invent testimony and stray details out of the air.8
The practice of using jailhouse snitches in serious criminal cases
is both pervasive and, as a direct result, a major cause of error in the
criminal justice system.9 Although it had long been apparent that
jailhouse snitch testimony was sometimes extremely unreliable, the
strong link between jailhouse snitches and wrongful convictions has
only become clear recently thanks to the still-breaking wave of DNA
exonerations.10 Analysis of the causes of wrongful convictions in
these cases reveals that jailhouse snitches have been involved in a
surprisingly large percentage of known wrongful convictions—
twenty-one percent—according to Innocence Project founders Barry
Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer.11 The Scheck, Neufeld, and
Dwyer study looked at exonerations resulting from DNA testing, a

7. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals
as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996).
8. Id. at 1394.
9
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 6–7.
10
Id. at 7.
11. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000).
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sample that included a disproportionately large percentage of sexual
assault cases.12
Jailhouse informants play an even more pernicious role in capital
cases.13 One criminal defense attorney testified before a Los Angeles
County grand jury that she had conducted a study of all cases in
which a California defendant received the death penalty and
concluded that jailhouse informant testimony was used in
approximately one-third of those cases.14
According to the
Northwestern University Law School’s Center on Wrongful
Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful convictions in
capital cases involved testimony by jailhouse informants or by “killers
with incentives to cast suspicion away from themselves,” making
“snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital
cases.”15 The Commission on Capital Punishment convened by
former Illinois Governor George Ryan concluded that testimony from
jailhouse informants appeared to be a major cause of wrongful
convictions in the cases it looked at involving persons sentenced to
death in Illinois.16
A.
Jailhouse Informants Face Overwhelming Temptations to
Commit Perjury
Jailhouse snitches testify not out of the goodness of their hearts,
but to obtain one or more of a variety of incentives typically offered to
them. These incentives range from almost trivial benefits, like
cigarettes, to improved jail conditions and cash payments,17 up to the

12

Id. at 244–46.
13. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 7.
14. REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY:
INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 37, available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/expert/19891990%20LA%20County%20Grand%20Jury%20Report.pdf [hereinafter
GRAND JURY REPORT]. Following release of the Grand Jury Report, the
L.A. County District Attorney’s Office adopted stringent controls over the
use of jailhouse snitches and now rarely permits their use at trial.
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 189–90.
15. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE
SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER
INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2004–2005), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf
[hereinafter THE SNITCH SYSTEM].
16. GEORGE H. RYAN, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
7–8
(2002),
available
at
http://illinoismurderindictments.law.northwestern.edu/docs/Illinois_Mo
ratorium_Commission_complete-report.pdf.
17. Harris County, Texas, has recently begun a program offering
jailhouse informants up to $5000 for helpful information. See Renee C.
Lee, Harris Co. Sheriff Offers Cash for Jailhouse Tipsters, HOUS. CHRON.,
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gold standard of cooperation benefits—release or reduction of jail
sentences.18 Indeed, testifying against fellow inmates may often
constitute a prisoner’s only hope of escaping a substantial prison
term.19 The unscrupulous inmate thus faces powerful temptations to
serve as a jailhouse snitch. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[i]t is
difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of
a reduced sentence.”20 Another court noted that it was “obvious” that
cooperation premised on promises of leniency or immunity “provide a
strong inducement to falsify” testimony.21 Even in cases where
leniency or immunity is not at stake, the prospect of receiving some
tangible reward for false testimony can be irresistible. As one
attorney commented, “[w]hen you dangle extra rewards, furloughs,
money, their own clothes, stereos, in front of people in overcrowded
jails, then you have an unacceptable temptation to commit perjury.”22
Not only are the temptations to manufacture false snitch
testimony powerful, the difficulty of doing so is minimal. As a
Canadian commission created to investigate the causes of one
wrongful conviction observed, “[i]n-custody confessions are often easy
to allege and difficult, if not impossible, to disprove.”23 To generate a
credible confession, a snitch need only learn some basic details about
a fellow inmate’s case.24 A lying jailhouse snitch might gather
information about a high profile case simply by reading newspaper
stories or watching TV broadcasts about the case.25 Snitches can also
Jan. 10, 2011, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Harris-Co-sheriff-offers-cash-for-jailhouse-1623204.php.
18
Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating
Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND.
L. REV. 921, 935–36 (2009).
19. See Carl N. Hammarskjold, Comment, Smokes, Candy, and the
Bloody Sword: How Classifying Jailhouse Snitch Testimony as Direct,
Rather Than Circumstantial, Evidence Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2011) (citing Maxwell v. Roe,
628 F.3d 486, 505 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010)) (describing one jailhouse snitch’s
boast to have lied in exchange for “$30.00 from petty cash” and “some
smokes and candy”); Morrison, supra note 18 (noting that a “successful
cooperator . . . might ultimately get years off his sentence or even avoid
prison altogether”).
20. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.
1987).
21. United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980).
22. Robert Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer: He Shows How
to Fabricate a Prisoner’s Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at A17
(quoting Robert Berke, a lawyer for California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice).
23. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY
PAUL
MORIN
599,
available
at
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/mor
in_ch3cd.pdf.
24
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71.
25. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–73.
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obtain details about fellow prisoners’ cases by speaking with complicit
friends and relatives who can monitor preliminary hearings and other
case proceedings and feed details to the aspiring snitch.26 In some
cases, informants share knowledge about case facts with each other,
permitting multiple informants to corroborate each other’s
testimony.27 Investigators have documented cases in which prison
inmates purchased information from others outside of prison in an
attempt to trade it for reduced sentences.28 And now there is the
Internet. As one commentator has observed, “[t]he combination of the
increasing availability of information over the internet and inmate
internet access makes fabricating confessions even easier than ever
before.”29
The ease with which jailhouse informants can fabricate credible
confessions was demonstrated by one particularly industrious snitch,
Leslie Vernon White, a “convicted kidnapper, robber and car thief.”30
In 1990, the CBS news program 60 Minutes aired a segment featuring
White, a self-proclaimed jailhouse snitch.31 Two years earlier, White
demonstrated for jailers how simple it was to concoct a confession and
convince prosecutors it was genuine.32 He repeated the performance
while on camera for the CBS news program.33 White’s methods were
shocking in their audacity. To get information, he simply picked up
the telephone and asked for it.34 To get government officials to talk,
White posed as a law enforcement official or a government worker,
and in that guise, contacted various government agencies, including
the Sheriff’s information bureau, the county coroner, and the district
attorney handling the case, from whom he obtained details about the
facts and evidence of the case.35 Then he arranged to be transported
to or from the courthouse with the defendant who supposedly made
26. Id. at 70–71.
27. Id. at 68.
28. See Brad Heath, How Snitches Buy Their Freedom, USA TODAY, Dec.
14,
2012,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/14/jailhouseinformants-for-sale/1762013/.
29. Peter P. Handy, Jailhouse Informants' Testimony Gets Scrutiny
Commensurate with Its Reliability, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 755, 759
(2012).
30. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 629 n.192 (2009) (quoting Steve Mills & Ken
Armstrong, The Inside Informant, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at A1).
31
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71.
32. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Part 3: The Jailhouse Informant, CHI.
TRIB.,
Nov.
16,
1999,
available
at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-11-16/news/chi991116deathillinois3_1_court-and-police-records-murder-confessionsjailhouse-informant.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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the confession so that he could plausibly establish an opportunity for
the defendant’s alleged confession to have been made to him.36
Having gathered the basic case information and established a
context in which the supposed confession occurred, it was easy for
White to approach a homicide detective or a prosecutor with a deal.37
“The key thing is they want to win,” White explained.38
So if I come forward with the information as detailed
as that they’re gonna use it. Because the jury not
knowing the system or how it works, is going to believe
when I get up there with all these details and facts,
that this guy sat in the jail cell, or he sat on the bus,
or he sat in the holding tank somewhere, or told me
through a door or something, they’re gonna believe
me.39
Over the course of several years, White appeared as a
government witness in numerous cases and offered to appear in even
more.40 In return, he received various rewards for doing so, including
a letter recommending parole from a high-ranking official in the
District Attorney’s office.41 These benefits did not always work out
well for the citizens of California. On White’s last furlough, he used
the opportunity to beat his wife, snatch a purse, and assault his
landlady with a knife.42
As a result of the furor caused by White’s confession and his
startling demonstration of the ease with which he could manufacture
false jailhouse confessions, Los Angeles County convened a grand jury
investigation.43 The Grand Jury commenced a year-long examination
of the jailhouse informant problem in the County.44 What it found
was even more shocking than White’s demonstration. Based on
extensive documentary and witness testimony, the Grand Jury
learned of the existence of a complex and pervasive “informant
system” at work in Los Angeles County, one that was driven by “the
unwritten understanding between prosecutors and informants as to
the benefits to be derived from their testimony.”45 In its report, the
Grand Jury described a system set up to manufacture false jailhouse

36. Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39.GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72.
40
See Reinhold, supra note 22.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43
GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1–2.
44
Id. at 2.
45.Id. at 39.
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informant testimony.46 At the county jail, known informants were
segregated and housed in a special unit—known as the K-9 unit.47
Police officers and prosecutors in need of additional evidence could
request that an inmate be housed in the K-9 unit, and those requests
were routinely granted.48 The delivery of fresh meat to the K-9 unit
typically set off a feeding frenzy among the seasoned snitches housed
there, and it was not unusual for several K-9 inmates to contact
officials with reports of alleged confessions only hours after the
unsuspecting prisoner’s arrival.49 Attempts to obtain information
from the unwitting inmate might begin in minutes.50
The Grand Jury found evidence that not only did clever
informants like Leslie Vernon White find ways to gather facts needed
to fool police and prosecutors into believing that they had heard a
defendant confess to a crime, but in some cases police and prosecutors
actively colluded with jailhouse informants to manufacture false
evidence.51 These officials, some informants testified, provided them
with copies of arrest reports, trial transcripts, and case files; took the
informants to crime scenes; and sometimes simply fed them the facts
of the crime in order to help the informants develop convincing
testimony.52
Snitches, moreover, risk little by fabricating false testimony.
Perjury prosecutions of lying jailhouse informants are almost
nonexistent.53 As a case in point, following the Los Angeles County
Grand Jury’s investigation of the jailhouse informant problem, and
despite discovery of large-scale and pervasive deception by jailhouse
informants, the only two individuals prosecuted for providing
perjured testimony in any court or case were the grand jury witnesses
46

See id. at 19.
Id. at 9.
48
See id. at 54–55.
49
See id. at 56 (“Within twenty-four hours of the inmate’s arrival . . . an informant
called the Los Angeles Police Department and left a message for the detective that
he had information about the inmate. . . . [T]hree days after arranging for the
inmate to be placed with informants, the detective interviewed three informants,
each of whom claimed to have obtained incriminating information from the
inmate.”).
50.Ted Rohrlich, Authorities Go Fishing for Jailhouse Confessions, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at A1.
51.See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27–28.
52
Id.
53. For example, in an infamous case known as the “Marietta Seven,”
James Creamer and six others were wrongfully convicted between 1973
and 1975 of murdering two doctors in Marietta, Georgia, based largely
on the perjured testimony of an informant testifying under immunity.
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 8–9. After extensive findings
undermining the snitch’s credibility, the convictions were reversed and
charges dropped against all seven defendants. Id. at 9–11. Despite calls
to prosecute the snitch, the District Attorney declined to bring perjury
charges. Id. at 11.
47
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that had helped to expose the problems in the jailhouse snitch
system.54 In contrast, snitches who helped convict other innocent
defendants were never prosecuted.55 The message is clear—lying
snitches have little to lose and everything to gain by falsely reporting
to police and testifying to juries that fellow inmates have confessed to
crimes.
Witnesses suspected of lying to benefit criminal defendants, on
the other hand, do not fare nearly so well. When a witness is thought
to have lied on behalf of a criminal defendant, the witness is far more
likely to be prosecuted for perjury. In one prominent Illinois case
involving the killing of a Chicago police officer, six witnesses initially
gave statements to police implicating Jonathan Tolliver as a
suspect.56 Those same witnesses later recanted their statements.57
According to the witnesses, the original statements had been coerced
from them by police.58 The witnesses, however, paid dearly for the
recantations. Five of the witnesses were charged with perjury and
ultimately pled guilty to avoid even more serious sanctions.59
Prosecutors then trumpeted the convictions as proof that the
allegations that the witnesses’ testimony had been coerced by police
were false.60
Inmates thus find it easy to fabricate incriminating evidence
against fellow defendants and costly to retract incriminating
statements once made.
Where the rewards for providing
incriminating evidence are great, and where the costs of providing
false testimony on behalf of the State are negligible, the “frequency of
fabrication by witnesses who have made ‘deals’ with the government,”
as one commentator has observed, “while impossible to ascertain with
accuracy, is potentially staggering.”61
The easy availability of such powerful but unreliable evidence
inevitably tempts both incautious and unethical prosecutors and law
enforcement officials. The temptation to use snitch testimony is so
great, and the costs so low, that prosecutors frequently put on such

54

See Ted Rohrlich, L.A. Jailhouse Informant Seized on Perjury Charge, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-0220/news/mn-3537_1_jailhouse-informant-scandal; Ted Rohrlich, Perjurer
Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-20/local/me-312_1_law-enforcement-officer.
55
See Rohrlick, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, supra note 54.
56
People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524, 534–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
57.Id.
58
Id. at 531–34.
59.Stefano Esposito, Last of Five Accused of Perjury in Ceriale Slaying
Trial Sentenced, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004.
60
Id.
61. R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice
Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1129, 1130 (2004).
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testimony despite multiple red flags. Confirmation bias and tunnel
vision are likely significant explanations for the frequency with which
jailhouse snitch testimony that was later proved false is accepted and
used by prosecutors.62 Confirmation bias describes the tendency, well
documented by cognitive researchers, for individuals to seek out
evidence that confirms their pre-existing beliefs and minimize or
ignore evidence that contradicts those beliefs.63 Tunnel vision,
similarly, refers to the tendency of persons to ignore or downplay facts
or evidence inconsistent with an individual’s pre-existing beliefs.64 It
is a product of the “‘compendium of common heuristics and logical
fallacies,’ to which we are all susceptible, [and] that lead[s] actors in
the criminal justice system to ‘focus on a suspect, select and filter the
evidence that will “build a case” for conviction, while ignoring or
suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.’”65 Prosecutorial
tunnel vision has been identified as a major cause of wrongful
convictions.66 Confirmation bias and tunnel vision help explain why
prosecutors often continue to defend the credibility of jailhouse snitch
testimony even after it has been confirmed in exoneration proceedings
to have been false.67

62. As Peter Joy has explained, “[t]here are a number of psychological
impediments the prosecutor faces, including tunnel vision, which may
make the prosecutor a poor judge” of a witness’s credibility. Peter A. Joy,
Constructing Systemic Safeguards Against Informant Perjury, 7 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 677, 680 (2010).
63. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998); Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations,
15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315 (2009).
64. See Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the
Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1044 (2009) (“An
investigator exhibiting tunnel vision selects and filters evidence with an
eye toward building a case against that suspect and consequently
overlooks evidence that undermines it.”).
65
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision
in Criminal Cases, 2 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (2006) (quoting Dianne L. Martin,
Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel
Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 847,
848 (2002)).
66. Id. at 293 (noting that “[m]ost official inquiries into specific wrongful
convictions have noted the role that tunnel vision played in those
individual cases of injustice”).
67. See Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA,
Habeas Corpus And Justice, 12 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 233, 235 (2002)
(noting that “even after DNA testing has proven the innocence of a
prisoner, prosecutors refuse to accept the results and rely upon other
evidence that supports guilt, or they create a new theory of how the crime
occurred (never before put to the judge and jury) to justify the continued
punishment of an innocent person”).
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The ease with which false jailhouse snitch testimony can be
manufactured also plays into the hands of corrupt police officers and
prosecutors who are seeking shortcuts to conviction or are engaged in
corrupt conduct. Research on wrongful convictions, for example,
demonstrates that police are likely to set up innocent people, when
they do, by using evidence that is easy to manufacture and hard to
disprove.68 Jailhouse snitch testimony fits that description. As the
first-hand accounts provided by seasoned snitches prove, it is almost
laughably simple to conjure up a plausible, albeit false, claim that a
criminal defendant made a jailhouse confession.
Once such
allegations have been made by an informant, the informant has much
to gain by sticking to his story, and even more to lose by retracting
it.69
B. Compensated Witnesses Are Inherently Biased
A jailhouse informant is the quintessential self-interested
witness. Anglo-American law has long recognized the potentially
distorting effects of self-interest on the accuracy and reliability of
legal proceedings.70 Indeed, “[s]elf-interested witnesses were barred
from testifying under early common law,”71 and informers in
particular were viewed as incompetent witnesses if they stood to
directly gain some material benefit from their testimony.72 Although
68. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful
Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (2013) (observing that
corrupt law enforcement officers who framed innocent individuals in the
Rampart scandal typically charged defendants with crimes that are
“easily manufactured” and difficult to defend against because they pitted
the police officers’ word against that of the defendant).
69. In some cases, jailhouse snitch systems have operated, and may still
be operating, that call into question the integrity and honesty of law
enforcement officials at a system-wide level. See GRAND JURY REPORT,
supra note 14, at 18–19.
70
See United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210 (1842).
71.Warren Moïse, I'm Booored! Bias and the Busy Trial Lawyer, S.C. L.,
Jan. 2009, at 10, 11; see also Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 210 (describing
the general rule at common law as “undoubtedly” providing “in criminal
cases as well as in civil cases, that a person interested in the event of the
suit or prosecution, is not a competent witness”). Justice Story, however,
acknowledged numerous exceptions to the general rule. For example, “a
person who is to receive a reward for or upon the conviction of the
offender” was “universally recognised as a competent witness, whether
the reward be offered by the public or by private persons.” Id. at 211
(citing King v. Williams, 9 Barn. & Cress. 549, 556 for the grounds of the
exception); Carla Spivack, Let's Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar
Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247, 299 (2011) (noting the historical
“common-law bar to interested witnesses testifying in any proceeding”).
72. As counsel argued to the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Murphy, “[i]nformers are, generally, incompetent witnesses,
where they are to receive any portion of the decree, sentence or judgment,
without the necessity of a second suit.” 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 205–06 (citing
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the common-law bar on self-interested witnesses has generally been
abandoned, awareness of the effect of self-interest on decision making
continues to grow.73 Cognitive researchers have documented the
powerful biasing effect of self-interest on objectivity.74 Human
judgment is almost inevitably influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by perceived self-interest.75 Where persons must
decide which of two positions to adopt or accept as true, those who
stand to benefit from taking one position rather than another tend to
favor the position that furthers their own self-interest.76 Recognition
of the biasing effect of self-interest provides a basis for a wide variety
of legal rules. Self-interest bars some witnesses from testifying in
probate proceedings,77 for instance, and “self-serving bias” has been
recognized in some contexts as grounds for regulating the types of
compensation that a witness might be provided for testifying.
For example, normally “payments to witnesses in return for
testimony are considered unethical and illegal.”78 Lawyers who
provide such incentives to witnesses are subject to professional
sanctions.79 There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Expert
witnesses, who are retained by parties and paid significant sums to
United States v. The Schooner Thomas and Henry, 1 Brock. Rep. 374;
Tilly's Case, 1 Str. 316; Rex v. Stone, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545).
73
See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947–48 (2003).
74. Id. (stating that the existence of self-serving bias has been
established in numerous studies). According to Griffith, “[s]elf-serving
bias involves selective information processing, according to which a
subject sees what it wants to see and conflates what is fair with what
benefits oneself.” Id. at 1948 (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1947–48.
76. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 569 (2003) (“It has long been understood that
when people are better off if something is true, they become more likely
to perceive it as true.”).
77. Some states have enacted statutory bars on testimony by interested
parties in probate proceedings. See, e.g., Howle v. Edwards, 11 So. 748,
749 (Ala. 1892) (discussing an 1891 statute providing that “no person
having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit shall be allowed to
testify against the party to whom his interest is opposed, as to any
transaction with or statement by the deceased person whose estate is
interested in the result of the suit or proceedings”).
78. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches
and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
79. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 815–16 (Fla. 2003)
(imposing a 90-day suspension on a lawyer who provided financial
inducement to a witness to provide factual testimony, because “payment
of compensation other than costs to a witness could adversely affect
credibility and fact-finding functions”). See generally Joseph Swanson,
Let's Be Honest: A Critical Analysis of Florida Bar v. Wohl and the
Generally Inconsistent Approach Toward Witness Inducement
Agreements in Civil and Criminal Cases, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083
(2005).
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testify on the party’s behalf in court, are an obvious example.80
Ethical rules attempt to constrain the degree to which compensated
expert witnesses have a stake in the outcome of the cases in which
they testify.81 Almost every jurisdiction forbids expert witnesses from
being paid on a contingent fee basis in recognition that such a fee
arrangement would unduly bias the expert’s testimony and be likely
to induce the witness to tailor her testimony to favor the party on
whose behalf she is testifying.82 Ethics experts have continued to
express concern about even non-contingent-fee arrangements with
expert witnesses.83 The mere act of soliciting an initial opinion in a
case provides expert witnesses with incentives to provide a favorable
assessment because doing so greatly enhances the likelihood that
they will be retained and paid for future testimony.84
In criminal law, aside from experts and the parties themselves,
the most common type of compensated or incentivized witness is the
informant.85 Informants come in many shapes and sizes. There are
informants on the street who are paid to feed information to police.86
There are accomplices, codefendants, and coconspirators who seek
cooperation deals with prosecutors in order to reduce or avoid their
criminal exposure.87 The use of informants pervades the criminal
justice system. According to one account, approximately one in eight
federal prisoners had their sentences reduced as a result of providing
information to federal prosecutors.88 All such witnesses are prone to
self-serving bias, as are the police and prosecutors who benefit from
their testimony.89 One might argue, therefore, that all informant

80

Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 465, 477 (1999) (“Unlike other witnesses who can be reimbursed for only
expenses, an expert may be paid a fee for preparing and testifying in court.”).
81
See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 1988)
(discussing ethical problems with contingent fees); Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d
319, 322–23 (Tenn. 1998) (holding a contingency fee void as against public
policy).
82. Lubet, supra note 80.
83
Id. at 477–78.
84. Id. at 478.
85
Harris, supra note 78.
86
Id. at 3.
87. See Morrison, supra note 18, at 931 (describing how cooperating
defendants are recruited by prosecutors).
88. See Heath, supra note 28.
89. Of course, many types of witnesses testify in contexts where it is clear
that they have an interest in the outcome. Mothers testify about the good
character of their children, and husbands and wives, girlfriends and
boyfriends, friends and coworkers testify about alibis of their friends and
loved ones. Plaintiffs and defendants testify about facts surrounding civil
disputes with thousands or even millions of dollars on the line. As
explained below, jailhouse snitches are demonstrably different. They
have no direct knowledge of the facts of a case, little if any reputation to
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testimony, and perhaps all incentivized testimony more generally, is
compromised as a result of self-serving bias.90
Jailhouse snitches, however, pose more of a problem than paid
expert witnesses or even other types of snitches. The impact of a
biased expert witness can be muted in many cases by the proffer of
competing expert testimony. In a classic “battle of experts,” each side
can call out an opposing expert whose opinion strays too far from the
facts or mainstream science, or at least make clear to the jury that
the opposing expert’s interpretation is subject to debate. In addition,
most credible expert witnesses face reputational constraints that
limit the expert’s willingness to proffer knowingly false or misleading
testimony.91 The same cannot be said for jailhouse snitches whose
reputations are already marginal. Nor is it realistic to think that
criminal defendants can combat jailhouse snitch testimony, or even
the testimony of cooperating accomplice witnesses, street snitches,
and the like, by calling comparable witnesses of their own. A criminal
defendant lacks the ability to commandeer helpful testimony from
such witnesses because, unlike the prosecutor, he lacks any power to
reward such witnesses with leniency or immunity from prosecution.92
And whereas prosecutors routinely reward street informants for
information and testimony, a criminal defendant who paid a street
informant to testify on his behalf would likely be charged with
tampering or bribing witnesses.93 Nonetheless, it is not implausible
to assume that in many cases some types of cooperating accomplices
and street snitches do have a credible basis for their testimony.
Testimony provided by a codefendant who admits to being present at
the crime scene, for example, can be tested against the known facts
and evidence in the case, including the defendant’s own account
where the defendant chooses to testify.
In contrast, a criminal defendant is typically helpless to counter
testimony provided by a lying jailhouse informant. Unlike with
experts, defendants cannot usually put on their own “jailhouse
snitch,” so criminal defendants lack any opportunity to fight back on
an even playing field. In criminal trials there is no “battle of snitches”
protect, and direct and powerful incentives to manufacture testimony
that is easy to conjure and difficult to rebut.
90. That a witness has received payments from the government in
exchange for information or cooperation is a materially exculpatory fact
that must be disclosed pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. See, e.g., United
States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
government’s failure to disclose that a witnesses had received payments
from the FBI violated Brady).
91
Lubet, supra note 80, at 465.
92. See J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness, Why Is it OK for the
Prosecution, but Not the Defense?, 11 CRIM. JUST., no. 4, Winter 1997, at
21 (arguing that compensating witnesses violates the federal bribery
statute).
93
Id. at 22.
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that might balance competing versions of events. The criminal
defendant can try, as many have, to call other inmates to testify that
the defendant did not make any jailhouse confession.94 But such
testimony is, on its face, usually irrelevant, and courts will often bar
it as such.95 Even when allowed, however, it is not likely to be
effective. After all, such witnesses cannot prove the negative—that
an alleged confession did not actually occur—if the jailhouse
informant testifies, as an untruthful jailhouse informant invariably
will, that the confession was made out of earshot of other prisoners.
Finally, whereas ethical rules bar contingent fee agreements with
experts out of fear that such arrangements will bias witness
testimony, jailhouse informants—and indeed all informants—testify
almost exclusively under arrangements that create de facto
contingent payment arrangements. Because “payment” in terms of
leniency almost always is granted by the prosecutor after the
informant testifies, the informant readily understands that the
informant’s chances of getting rewarded are contingent on his
delivery of credible incriminating evidence against the defendant.
II.

JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS HIGHLY PERSUASIVE
EVIDENCE

Jailhouse snitch testimony is problematic for another reason.
There is, by and large, only one thing to which a jailhouse snitch can
testify: that a fellow inmate confessed, and confession evidence is
widely acknowledged to possess unique potency.96 As the Supreme
Court has observed, confessions are “probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted.”97 One prominent evidence
scholar asserted that “introduction of a confession makes the other
aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”98 Research confirms that
evidence that the defendant has confessed greatly increases the odds
of conviction.99 In a study conducted by Kassin and Neumann,
researchers presented mock jurors with a variety of evidence of guilt,
and found that jurors were far more likely to convict suspects when
the evidence included a confession than when other types of
traditional evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or physical

94

See, e.g., Short v. Sirmons, 472 F.3d 1177, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the impeachment testimony of a fellow cellmate was not material).
95
Id.
96
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed.
1983).
99
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence:
An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 469, 471 (1997).
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evidence, were presented.100 They thus concluded that “confession
evidence has a greater impact on jurors—and is seen as having a
greater impact by jurors—than other potent types of evidence.”101
Secondary confessions—that is, confessions made to witnesses
(other than police officers)—are likely not as persuasive to jurors as
direct confessions.102 Jurors do, as a general matter, discount
secondary confession evidence to some extent, and jurors may often
be unwilling to convict based on secondary confession evidence
alone.103 However, secondary confession evidence remains extremely
potent. “Since few species of evidence are as powerful as an
acknowledgement of guilt from the mouth of the accused, jailhouse
informant testimony can be highly persuasive.”104
Secondary
confession evidence is likely to be particularly critical in “close
cases.”105 That is, jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most
influential where the State has some other evidence of guilt, but that
other evidence is weak.106 And these cases are precisely the ones in
which jailhouse snitches are most likely to be used.107 After all, the
State must pay a price to induce the jailhouse snitch to testify, and it
can be expected to avoid doing so unless prosecutors believe that the
testimony is needed.108 Accordingly, jailhouse snitch testimony will
typically only be introduced when the prosecutor is concerned about
the sufficiency of her case, and the testimony will tend to have the
greatest impact in precisely those cases.109
The prevailing assumption by courts, and the justification for
admitting jailhouse snitch testimony absent any significant
reliability review or assessment, is that jurors are capable of
discounting unreliable snitch testimony as the facts and
circumstances warrant.110 This assumption is almost certainly
incorrect. Research on fundamental attribution error demonstrates
that jurors cannot properly discount snitch testimony, even when
they know that snitches have incentives to lie.111
100

Id. at 481.
101. Id.
102
Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide
Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 261, 274 (2008).
103
Id.
104. Id.
105
Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et. al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse
Informants on Jury Decisionmaking, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 138 (2008).
106. Cf., Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the
Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 27 (1997) (noting that evidence of coerced confessions was
extremely influential in a test case where other evidence was weak).
107
Neuschatz et al., supra note 105.
108
Id.
109
See id.
110
Kassin & Neumann, supra note 99, at 470.
111
Neuschatz et al., supra note 105, at 142.
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In a recent study, a team of researchers set out to test the claim
that jurors are able to effectively discount secondary confession
evidence provided by a cooperating witness with incentives to
fabricate evidence.112 Their findings undercut the assertion that
jurors are able to properly take into account the degree to which
witness incentives undermine reliability.113 In the study, the
researchers recruited 345 college students and persons from the
community to act as mock jurors.114 All of the mock jurors were given
an abbreviated trial transcript drawn from a real criminal case.115
The transcript set forth the testimony of two state witnesses, one who
provided fiber evidence and another who presented knife evidence,
and included opening and closing statements.116 The control group
received this transcript only.117 Other groups received the same
transcript, plus the testimony of an additional witness who claimed
to have heard the defendant confess to the crime.118 In some cases,
mock jurors were told that the witness had inadvertently learned of
the crime and came forward as an act of civic duty.119 In other cases,
they were told that the witness was testifying pursuant to a
cooperation deal in which the witness would directly benefit from his
testimony.120 The researchers then asked all of the mock jurors to
assess the guilt of the defendant.121 Consistent with prior research,
researchers found that mock jurors who were given the confession
evidence convicted the defendant at significantly higher rates than
those who were not presented the confession evidence.122
More disturbing, however, the researchers found that the mock
jurors who were presented with the confession evidence convicted at
the same rate regardless of the source of the evidence.123 Conviction
rates, their data indicated, “were unaffected by the explicit provision
of information indicating that the witness received an incentive to
testify.”124 Although the mock jurors’ questionnaire responses
demonstrated that they understood that the “civic duty” witness was
more interested in serving justice than the “incentivized” witness, the

112. Id. at 137.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 139.
115
Id. at 140–41.
116
Id. at 140.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122. Id. at 142.
123 Id.
124. Id.
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mock jurors failed to discount the reliability of the incentivized
witness.125
The most plausible explanation for these results, as the
researchers suggest, is that the mock jurors were committing
“fundamental attribution error.”126 As they explain, “According to the
fundamental attribution hypothesis, perceivers will ignore the
contextual and situational factors in favor of a dispositional
attribution. In application to a jury situation, jurors should perceive
a witness’ behavior as influenced by personal factors rather than
situational demands.”127
The vast majority of participants in the experiment seemed to
make just this mistake, dismissing the possibility that important
contextual factors like incentives for incriminating another suspect
might influence the witness’s motives to provide truthful
testimony.128 The mock jurors instead simply accepted the witness’s
testimony at face value.129
Prior studies similarly have concluded that “attributors attach
insufficient weight to situational causes and accept behavior at ‘face
value.’”130 To be sure, some of these studies have found evidence that
subjects were able to engage in some critical assessment of certain
types of confession evidence.131 For instance, where subjects were
told that a confession was coerced through threats or violence, they
tended to more heavily discount the credibility of the confession.132
After conducting one such study in which investigators provided
subjects with trial transcripts from a mock case presenting a variety
of evidence to the subjects, the investigators found that the subjects
consistently gave some types of evidence more weight than others.133
Although subjects continued to be more likely to convict in confession
cases than nonconfession cases, subjects generally viewed confessions
made in exchange for positive rewards as more credible than
confessions made in response to threats.134
When the coercive influence was operationally defined
as a threat of harm or punishment, subjects clearly
discounted the confession evidence—they viewed the

125

Id.
Id.
127. Id.
128
Id.
129. Id. at 142, 146.
130. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and
Mock Juror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 134 (1980) (citing
studies).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
126
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confession as involuntary and manifested a relatively
low rate of conviction. However, when coercion took
the form of an offer or a promise of leniency, subjects
were unable or unwilling to dismiss the prior
confession.135
Although this research demonstrates that jurors have the
capacity to overcome fundamental attribution bias and discount
certain types of confession evidence, it does nothing to increase
confidence in jurors’ capacity to properly assess jailhouse snitch
testimony induced through positive incentives.
Rather, these
findings cast further doubt on jurors’ ability to adequately discount
the reliability of jailhouse snitch testimony that has been induced
through positive incentives.
Juror insensitivity to the increased unreliability of incentivized
witness testimony is magnified by two additional factors. First, as
discussed above, typical jurors almost certainly do not understand
how easy it is for jailhouse snitches to manufacture detailed false
confessions. If jailhouse snitches testify about details that seem like
they could only have been learned if the perpetrator had actually
confessed to the snitch, but were actually gathered through the
variety of approaches that snitches like Sidney Storch have admitted
to using, then jailhouse snitch testimony will often be viewed as more
credible than it should be.
Second, many jurors might perceive jailhouse snitch testimony as
worthy of enhanced credence because of implicit or explicit
prosecutorial bolstering of the witness’s credibility. The mere fact
that a prosecutor calls a jailhouse informant to serve as a State’s
witness suggests that the prosecutor has already determined the
witness to be credible and truthful. Although the amount of
presumptive credit the jury extends to state witnesses will vary
depending on both the local community’s and the individual juror’s
views regarding prosecutorial honesty and integrity, in many
jurisdictions the State begins with the benefit of the doubt.136
Moreover, even though it constitutes improper practice, it is not
uncommon for prosecutors to affirmatively vouch for, or bolster, the
135. Id. at 143–44.
136. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1423, 1465 (2001) (“The prosecutor enjoys presumptive credibility
in the eyes of the jury and, unlike witnesses who take an oath and are
subject to testing through cross-examination and impeachment, the
prosecutor is rarely specifically so challenged.”); see also United States v.
Gonzalez-Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977) (observing that “the
representative of the government approaches the jury with the inevitable
asset of tremendous credibility”); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at
17 (stating that “jurors are somewhat predisposed to infer some degree of
reliability because the witness is presented by the state”).
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credibility of the jailhouse snitches they put on the witness stand.137
Take the controversial case of Troy Davis, who was executed in
2011.138 Davis was tried for the 1989 murder of Savannah police
officer Mark McPhail.139 At Davis’ trial in 1991, the State called a
jailhouse snitch named Kevin McQueen to testify about an alleged
confession made by Davis while the two men were on the prison
basketball court.140 The snitch’s testimony was suspect. Not only had
McQueen served as an informant for the State in other cases,141 but
his testimony was also seemingly implausible on its face. Numerous
witnesses testified at Davis’ trial that the persons who were involved
with the police officer shooting had been playing pool at a local pool
hall, that a man named Sylvester “Red” Coles had gotten into an
argument with a homeless man outside the pool hall, and that Troy
Davis and a friend—who had both also been playing pool at the hall
at the time—had followed Coles and his victim up the street to a
Burger King parking lot where the police officer—who was
responding to the fight between Coles and the homeless man—was
shot.142
When the State called jailhouse snitch McQueen to testify at
trial, however, McQueen claimed that Troy Davis had “confessed” to
him a very different set of facts.143 According to McQueen, Davis told
him that he had gone to a party in Cloverdale,144 a Savannah suburb,
137. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985) (“The
prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused . . . may induce the
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence.”).
138
Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1.
139
Trial transcript at 1228, State v. Davis, No. 089-2467 (E.D. Super. Ct. Ga Oct.
25, 1991) [hereinafter Davis Trial Transcript].
140
Id. at 1229.
141. Id. at 1228.
142
Id. at 1230.
143
Id.
144. Id. at 1230–31. (McQueen also claimed that Davis had confessed to
shooting someone at the party. According to McQueen, “when he was at
the party, he got into a beef with some dudes, and a whole bunch of
shooting and stuff going on. So after the party -- ” The D.A. interrupted.
“Did he say he did any shooting?” “Yeah,” McQueen answered. The D.A.
began to ask if “he was the one that shot” an individual named Michael
Cooper at the party, as Davis had been charged with that shooting in
addition to the shooting of police officer Mark McPhail. However, before
the prosecutor could get the name of the shooting victim out, defense
counsel cut him off, asking the judge to counsel the prosecutor not to lead
the witness. The judge obliged. The prosecutor then rephrased his
question: “What did he say about shooting somebody at the party?”
McQueen’s answer was vague: “Well, exchange of gunfire. He didn’t know
who shot who, you know, I guess it was the wrong guy, you know, got
hung up that night.” McQueen then testified that Davis told him that.)
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and that after the party, he had gone to his girlfriend’s house, that
they had decided to get breakfast at Burger King, and that he ran into
someone who owed Davis money that was loaned to buy “dope.”145
According to McQueen, Davis told him that “they got into some beef
there, and then a whole bunch of commotion started, and a dude came
in what turned out to be Officer McPhail, and there were some shots
fired.”146 On cross-examination, McQueen admitted that he had seen
a story about the shooting on the news but denied “hoping to gain any
advantage by testifying on behalf of the State, claiming that he had
already been sentenced for his crimes.”147
The supposed confession recounted by McQueen failed to match
up in almost any way with the other evidence in the case. McQueen’s
version of the confession put Davis in the wrong place, at the wrong
time, for the wrong reasons, in light of the evidence presented at trial
and the State’s own theory of the case.148 In fact, McQueen’s account
of this supposed confession was deemed, by the federal district court
judge who years later conducted a three-day habeas hearing on Troy
Davis’s contention of actual innocence, to be patently false because it
“totally contradict[ed] the events of the night as described by
numerous other State witnesses.”149 Indeed, the judge found that
McQueen’s trial testimony “was so clearly fabricated” that the Court
could not understand “why the State persist[ed] in trying to support
its veracity.”150
But the State’s position at trial and beyond was that McQueen’s
testimony was solid and credible.151 In his closing argument to the
jury, Savannah District Attorney Spencer Lawton beseeched the jury
to credit McQueen’s testimony.152 As he told the jury:
You heard from Kevin McQueen. Kevin McQueen
was, in Mr. Barker’s terms, the jailbird. Well, if you’re
going to talk to Troy Anthony Davis about what he did,
you’ve got to be where Troy Anthony Davis is, and
Kevin McQueen told you that he was told by Troy
Anthony Davis that . . . Davis had shot Officer
McPhail. There’s not a reason on earth to doubt his
word. There was nothing, no reason why he had to be

145

Id.
146. Id. at 1231.
147. In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *30 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 24, 2010).
148
Id. at *49.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151
Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139.
152
Id.
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here, except that we subpoenaed him when we learned
what he had to say.153
Notwithstanding that the jailhouse snitch’s testimony was later
dismissed as “clearly fabricated,” jurors were assured by the District
Attorney that “there’s not a reason on earth to doubt his word.”154 It
is difficult, in retrospect, to ascertain the weight that the jury
ultimately gave to McQueen’s testimony, but the attempt by
prosecutors to bolster McQueen’s testimony and convince the jury
that the jailhouse snitch was a reliable witness certainly could have
contributed to the jury’s decision to convict.
III.

STATUS QUO SAFEGUARDS ARE INEFFECTIVE

Despite the virtual avalanche of evidence that jailhouse snitch
testimony is inherently biased, unreliable, and frequently the cause
of wrongful convictions, few jurisdictions have taken any meaningful
steps to limit its use, and none bar it completely.155 Defenders of the
status quo contend that the traditional tools of litigation—vigorous
cross-examination and post-conviction review—adequately enable
criminal defendants to discredit lying jailhouse snitches or, where
jailhouse testimony was only later revealed to have been perjured, to
obtain postconviction relief.156 For reasons discussed below, neither
of these supposedly reliable litigation tools provides innocent
defendants with meaningful protections from being wrongfully
convicted because of false jailhouse snitch testimony.
A. Cross-Examination Constitutes an Inadequate Means to Check
False or Unreliable Jailhouse Snitch Testimony.
In Kansas v. Ventris,157 the U.S. Supreme Court had an
opportunity to adopt sweeping limitations on the use of jailhouse
informant testimony.158 Defendant Ray Ventris had been convicted
of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after he and an
accomplice named Rhonda Theel shot and killed a man in his home
and drove away with approximately $300 and the victim’s cell
phone.159 Theel pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to
153. Id. at 1501 (emphasis added).
154
Id.
155
See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 143 (explaining several states’ limitations on
jailhouse snitch testimony).
156
Id. at 142 (stating that the Supreme Court relies on the traditional litigation
tools, like cross-examination, to combat the potential for error in snitch testimony).
157
556 U.S. 586 (2008).
158. Id. at 594 n.* (rejecting the suggestion that the Court craft a broader
rule to exclude uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony).
159
Id. at 588–89.
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testify against Ventris.160 In exchange, prosecutors agreed not to
prosecute Theel for murder.161 At trial, Theel testified that Ventris
was the main instigator, while Ventris testified that Theel was
primarily responsible for the robbery and shooting.162
The State then called a jailhouse informant who had been
planted in Ventris’s holding cell for the specific purpose of gathering
“incriminating statements” from Ventris.163 Although the State
conceded that use of the jailhouse informant to elicit incriminating
statements from Ventris likely violated the Sixth Amendment, the
trial court permitted the informant’s testimony regarding Ventris’s
statements to come in for impeachment purposes.164 The informant
then testified that Ventris confessed to him that “‘[h]e’d shot this man
in his head and in his chest’ and taken ‘his keys, his wallet, about
$350.00, and . . . a vehicle.’”165
The jury acquitted Ventris on the murder count, but convicted
him of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.166 The Kansas
Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the admission
of Ventris’s purported confession obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment for impeachment purposes was erroneous.167 When the
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Ventris and amici on his behalf
argued, inter alia, that “jailhouse snitches are so inherently
unreliable” that the Court should “craft a broader exclusionary rule
for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means.”168 The Court
rejected that argument.169
As the Court explained, “[o]ur legal system . . . is built on the
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of
competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid
‘establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation
of state rules of criminal procedure.”170 The Court concluded that
statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be
used for impeachment purposes, and that the credibility of the
jailhouse informant’s testimony regarding Ventris’ alleged jailhouse

160

Id.
Id.
162. Id. at 589.
163. Id.
164
Id.
165. Id. (quoting State v. Ventris, No. 94,002, 2006 WL 2661161, at *3
(Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006)).
166
Id.
167
Id. (citing State v. Ventris, 176 P.3d 920, 928 (Kan. 2008)).
168.State v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009).
169
Id.
170. Id. (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)); see also
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)) (“A fundamental
premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”).
161

COVEY_FINALAUTHORREAD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

201x]

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

4/3/2015 2:07 PM

125

confession was a matter for the jury to determine.171 The Court thus
declined to impose more stringent regulation of jailhouse informant
testimony. Reasoning similarly, numerous state courts have also
rejected calls for greater regulation of jailhouse informant
testimony.172
The Court’s holding in Ventris followed the conventional notion
that credibility and reliability determinations should normally be left
to the fact finder.173 As the Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,174 “[v]igorous cross examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”175
The assumption, however, that vigorous cross-examination
provides an effective means of exposing or defeating unreliable
evidence is increasingly being questioned with respect to certain
types of evidence. The Oregon State Supreme Court recently decided
that in cases involving eyewitness identifications obtained through
suggestive police procedures, “‘traditional’ methods of testing
reliability—like cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting
unreliable or inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”176 As
the Oregon court noted, research studies have demonstrated that
mock jurors are surprisingly bad at distinguishing accurate and
inaccurate eyewitness identifications.177
Prominent academic
commentators have also concluded that judges and jurors often fail to
properly discount all sorts of direct and factual evidence, including
eyewitness testimony, because they are “often not aware of the factors
that decrease the reliability of eyewitness perception and memory,”
and not nearly as competent at evaluating the veracity of witnesses
testifying in court as commonly thought.178

171. Ventris, 556 U.S. at 594.
172. See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ky. 2003)
(rejecting a claim that testimony of a jailhouse informant should have
been excluded because it was inherently suspect, and its reliability
should have been the subject of a cautionary admonition because the rule
is that “the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given sworn
testimony are matters for the jury to decide”).
173
See Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014)
(stating “it is the job of the fact finder, not the trial court, to determine which
source is more credible and reliable”).
174
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
175. Id. at 596.
176. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012).
177. Id. at 695 n.9 (citing R.C.L. Lindsey et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness–Identification Inaccuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981)).
178. Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence
Really Different?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2013) (arguing that
the relevancy standard for factual evidence may be too lax).
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For these same reasons, the Court’s assumption in Ventris that
impeachment of unreliable or untruthful witnesses is sufficient to
protect criminal defendants from wrongful convictions is wrong in the
case of jailhouse snitches. As noted above, confession evidence is a
uniquely potent form of evidence in criminal trials. Jurors are almost
certain to give extraordinary weight to evidence that a defendant has
confessed. Where confession evidence has been obtained through the
use of coercion, the courts have long recognized that such evidence is
inadmissible, and that the conventional means of impeaching
unreliable
evidence—cross-examination—provides
insufficient
protection against undue prejudice.179 As Justice White observed in
Arizona v. Fulminante180:
A defendant’s confession is “probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted against him,” so damaging that a jury should
not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so.
Moreover, it is impossible to know what credit and
weight a juror gave to a confession.181
Strict exclusion is sometimes the only appropriate remedy where
extremely damaging but unreliable evidence threatens to “distort the
truth-seeking function of the trial.”182
Second, because jurors are likely to proceed under the biasing
influence of fundamental attribution error, the traditional stuff of
impeachment—the demonstration that a jailhouse snitch has a poor
character for honesty and self-interested motives to testify—will often
have little or no impact on jury decision making. Once the jury has
heard the evidence that the defendant has confessed to the crime, the
damage has already been done.
Third, unlike most other types of evidence frequently used in
criminal cases, jailhouse snitch testimony is often uniquely insulated
from effective impeachment. This insulation exists in part because
the incentives that jailhouse informants receive in exchange for
cooperation are typically hidden.183 Prosecutors rarely negotiate
See United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 50 (D.D.C. 2006) (“A long line
of Supreme Court precedent makes clear, ‘confessions which are involuntary, i.e.,
the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,’ are inadmissible.”).
180
499 U.S. 279 (1991).
181. Id. at 292 (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting)).
182. Id. at 293.
183. See Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1167 n.215 (noting that “[e]xamples
abound of significant inducements to accomplice witnesses that were
hidden from the defense at trial”); Harvey A. Silverglate, The Decline and
Fall of Mens Rea, 33 CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 14, 18 (noting that
“in practice, many types of inducements and threats often are implied,
the subject of a knowing wink of the eye by the prosecutor to the
179
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explicit deals with jailhouse snitches prior to their testimony.184
Rather, prosecutors and snitches operate with a shared
understanding that a snitch’s positive performance will eventually be
rewarded with tangible benefits.185 The lack of any record of benefits
promised to the informant impedes effective impeachment by defense
counsel, just as it was designed to do.186 The usual practice of refusing
to enter into any formal deal before the snitch testifies in court was
documented in one Florida case, where the prosecutor’s notes
memorializing his conversation with the snitch were later discovered
and became the subject of a Brady dispute.187 Here is how the
prosecutor summarized his conversation: “Spoke with Fred Landt
[Freeman’s defense counsel] regarding Dennis Freeman. Told him I
would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli’s] trial but assured him
his cooperation would be remembered with favor before mitigating
judge/Sturgis. Will make no formal deal on the record prior to
trial.”188
At an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim, the prosecutor
denied that the note indicated that she had made any undisclosed
deal with the informant.189 Regardless whether that claim was
technically correct, the note evidences what is already acknowledged
to be standard practice: prosecutors avoid making any formal deals
prior to trial, but provide sufficient post-trial rewards to snitches to
ensure a steady future supply.190 That practice was also apparent in
the notorious case of Cameron Todd Willingham.191 Willingham was
accused in Texas of murdering his three young daughters by arson.192
At his capital trial, Texas prosecutors called jailhouse snitch Johnny
Webb, who was serving a fifteen-year sentence for aggravated
robbery, to testify about a confession Willingham supposedly made.193

prospective
witness's
lawyer”),
available
at
http://www.threefeloniesaday.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rdMd9mcf
5ZA%3D&tabid=38.
184
Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1144 n.80.
185
Id. at 1129.
186
Id. at 1142.
187
Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Fla. 2006).
188. Id.
189
Id.
190
Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1148.
191
Willingham v. Cockrell, No. 02-10133, 2003 WL 1107011 (5th Cir. Feb. 17,
2001).
192
Id. at *1.
193
Paul Gianelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 221, 234 (2013) (explaining that lawyers seeking a posthumous
exoneration of Willingham have uncovered records indicating that, in fact,
prosecutors reduced charges against Webb from aggravated robbery to simple
robbery and also advocated on his behalf at a clemency hearing, citing his
participation in the Willingham case as a basis).
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After testifying improbably that Willingham, who hardly knew Webb,
confessed to him through a hole in a steel door in Willingham’s cell,
Webb denied that prosecutors had offered him any inducement to
testify.194 Nonetheless, “[f]ive years later the prosecutor asked the
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant Webb parole.”195 Webb
later recanted his trial testimony, but then recanted his
recantation.196 Willingham, who is widely believed to be innocent,
was executed by Texas in 2004.197
Jailhouse snitch testimony is also difficult to impeach effectively
because it is invariably of the “he said-she said” variety. As long as
the snitch can plausibly testify that he had an opportunity—no
matter how fleeting—to speak with the defendant, the snitch’s claim
that the defendant confessed to him is practically unverifiable.
Defense counsel can impugn the credibility of the snitch, but many
criminal defendants—especially defendants with a criminal history—
go into a jury trial with their own credibility highly suspect and will
often be unlikely to come out on top in any swearing contest. Whether
or not the jailhouse snitch is perceived to be believable may ultimately
turn simply on the comparative rhetorical skills of the prosecutor and
defense counsel.198 Defense attorneys equipped with superior crossexamination skills may successfully blunt the force of a jailhouse
snitch’s testimony, but the vast majority of criminal defendants
saddled with average or inferior counsel will have no such luck. It is
not unusual, moreover, for trial courts to affirmatively prevent the
defense from even questioning the snitch about the snitch’s criminal
history or the charges pending against him.199
194. Id. at 233–34; see Brandi Grissom, Citing New Evidence, Urging a
Posthumous Pardon in 1992 Case, TEX. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2013, at A19A,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/citing-new-evidenceurging-a-posthumous-pardon-in-1992-case.html?_r=0.
195. Gianelli, supra note 193, at 233–34.
196. Id. at 234–35 (noting also that Webb later admitted to a reporter
from The New Yorker magazine that he might have “misunderstood”
Willingham, adding “[t]he statute of limitations has run out on perjury,
hasn’t it?”).
197. See Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed
in
Texas,
INNOCENTS
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Cameron_Todd_Willingham_
Wrongfully_Convicted_and_Executed_in_Texas.php (last visited Sept. 1,
2014); David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?,
THE
NEW
YORKER,
Sept.
7,
2009,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann.
198. Stephen Bright made this point more generally in the context of
death penalty litigation. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
199
See, e.g., Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 821–822 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing
the trial court’s enforcement of the motion in limine precluding “the defense ‘from
mentioning or attempting to elicit testimony from any witness regarding the reason
for [the jailhouse snitch’s] incarceration’”).
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Apart from simply impeaching the character of the snitch or the
circumstances or plausibility of the snitch’s claim, there is very little
that defense counsel can do to counter snitch testimony. For a variety
of reasons, defense lawyers can rarely call witnesses of their own to
prove that the defendant did not confess to the snitch.200 In most
cases, a lying snitch will simply testify that the defendant confessed
in private, when there were no other witnesses to overhear the alleged
confession.201
And in some cases, inmates work together to
corroborate each other’s false testimony.202 The Los Angeles County
Grand Jury investigation on the County’s use of jailhouse informants
discovered several instances in which multiple inmates coordinated
their trial testimony to make their false claims more credible.203 Not
only is it difficult to find jailhouse witnesses who can effectively
counter snitch testimony, in some cases it is positively hazardous to
even try.204 One attorney told the Los Angeles Grand Jury that
jailhouse informants were so uniformly untrustworthy that he was
afraid to even interview them because he feared they might fabricate
some criminal activity that the attorney was engaged in, such as
suborning perjury.205 Whereas under current law prosecutors are
permitted to reward informants and cooperating witnesses with
substantial benefits in exchange for their helpful testimony, defense
lawyers have no comparable authority.206 Indeed, defense lawyers
who offer rewards to defense witnesses might be prosecuted for
witness tampering.207
In sum, the dynamics of jailhouse snitch testimony make crossexamination uniquely ill-suited to produce reliable results. While
suffering many similar defects, other forms of incentivized testimony,
such as that provided by cooperating accomplices, co-defendants, and
street snitches, at least provide defense counsel with some objective
factual context that might be used to assess the credibility of the
witness. As the NACDL argued to the Supreme Court in Ventris,
accomplice testimony retains at least some indicia of reliability

See, e.g., C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating
Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 10 (2003) (“A defense
witness whose freedom is at stake is often too scared of retribution to come
forward and offer valuable exculpatory evidence.”).
201
See, e.g., id. at 1 (describing the story of one man wrongfully convicted of
murder because a snitch lied about a confession).
202
See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18, 30.
203
See id.
204
See id. at 39.
205. Id.
206
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 186.
207
Id.
200
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because “the accomplice inculpates herself in the process.”208 In
contrast, “snitch testimony lacks even this form of corroboration.”209
For all these reasons, cross-examination cannot be relied upon to
ensure that false snitch testimony is not believed or that unreliable
evidence is not given undue weight by jurors.
B. Postconviction Review of False Jailhouse Snitch Testimony Is Also
Insufficient.
If cross-examination often proves wholly ineffective in countering
false jailhouse snitch testimony, the other traditional remedy—
postconviction review—is even more dysfunctional. First, the same
structural difficulties that plague efforts to impeach snitches through
cross-examination are present in a postconviction challenge of snitch
testimony. Rarely will evidence be available, postconviction, to prove
that a jailhouse snitch lied at trial.210 Credibility determinations are
largely the province of the fact finder and are almost never disturbed
on review.211 Second, even when reviewing courts do determine that
a jailhouse informant’s testimony was unreliable, or even plainly
false, courts rarely grant relief.212
In one puzzling case, for example, a defendant had been convicted
and sentenced to life in prison for allegedly participating in the rape
and murder of a young woman.213 The State’s evidence against the
defendant was weak. DNA evidence implicated another man but not
the defendant.214 The only physical evidence against the defendant
was a single pubic hair that had been recovered among sixteen others
from the crime scene.215 The hair was described as a nonexclusive
match to defendant’s hair type.216 The State conceded by stipulation
that defendant was excluded as a contributor of any of the other
fifteen hairs.217 One of these possibly matched another suspect in the
case.218 The State’s case against the defendant was built on this one
hair and the testimony of three witnesses.219 The first witness was a
fourteen-year-old boy, described in a psychological evaluation as
208. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 2, at 3.
209. Id.
210
See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 86–87
(2008).
211
5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 641 (2014).
212
See supra Subpart III.A.
213. People v. Lopes, No. C041516, 2004 WL 418350, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 2004).
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218. Id.
219
Id.
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having a penchant for lying, who gave inconsistent statements to
police, only one of which implicated the defendant, and who testified
at trial that the defendant was not involved in the attack.220 The
other two witnesses were jailhouse informants.221 The first jailhouse
informant, a man named Hopkins, testified that the defendant had
confessed to participating in the attack.222 Hopkins’ credibility was
dubious; according to the appellate court:
Hopkins admitted to hearing jail guards talking about
the case, but claimed he heard their conversations
after he first talked to the police. He said that
everyone in jail was talking about what happened in
defendant’s case. Hopkins also revealed that he had
provided testimony in two other special circumstance
murder cases. In exchange for his testimony, Hopkins
had three felony counts dismissed. His sentence of
four years ten months on the remaining counts he pled
guilty to was stayed and he was released from jail.
Furthermore, Hopkins’s statement that he talked with
defendant while they worked mornings together at the
same job in the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as
defendant never had a morning job.223
A second jailhouse informant named Cooper also testified that
defendant had admitted participating in the rape and murder.224 But
as the appellate court pointed out, this informant too had both a
record of prior cooperation and apparently strong incentives to
testify.225
Cooper was in the San Joaquin County jail on warrants for
charges of possession of precursors with intent to manufacture drugs
and receiving stolen property plus prior conviction enhancements.226
Cooper stated he was afraid that if he went to prison he would be
killed.227 Cooper also had a lengthy record of felony and misdemeanor
convictions dating to the 1970s and was on probation at the time of
his testimony.228 In exchange for his testimony, Cooper was allowed
to serve his time in Humboldt County, where he was placed in an

220

Id. at *1–2.
221. A fourth witness who knew nothing of the case at bar testified about
an incident occurring after the attack in which the defendant and others
allegedly fondled a teenage girl. Id. at *3.
222
Id. at *2.
223. Id. at *3.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
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alternative work program.229 After two days in that program, Cooper
left.230 He remained at large until just before the trial, when he was
arrested on a probation violation and sentenced to thirty days in
jail.231 When arrested, Cooper gave several fake names and birth
dates, apparently to avoid arrest on three outstanding felony
warrants.232 Cooper also admitted he had provided information to the
police to benefit himself a couple of times in the past.233
Notwithstanding the obvious flimsiness of the State’s case—
consisting entirely of one nonexclusively matching hair, an
inconsistent statement from an untrustworthy child, and the
testimony of two jailhouse snitches, one of whom was caught in a flat
lie and the other who had obvious incentives to help the State— the
jury convicted and the appellate court affirmed.234 The appellate
court reasoned that although there were serious problems with each
of the witnesses who testified, the witnesses corroborated each
other.235 The police statement given by the fourteen-year-old with a
propensity to lie was corroborated by the self-serving and clearly
perjurious testimony of the jailhouse snitch, and vice versa.236 The
appellate court seems to have thought that while a small amount of
untrustworthy evidence might provide an insufficient basis for
conviction, problems with the reliability of the State’s evidence could
be overcome by piling on more untrustworthy evidence.
Sometimes appellate judges simply do not know what to think
but affirm anyway. In one Georgia case, a habeas court denied relief
to a defendant who had been convicted of murder and armed robbery
almost entirely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant named
Donald Bates.237 At trial, Bates testified that the defendant Johnny
Ashley had made a jailhouse confession to him.238 Defense counsel
for Ashley adduced substantial impeachment evidence on crossexamination, but the jury convicted Ashley nonetheless.239 After

229

Id.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233. Id.
234
Id. at *1.
235. Id. at *5.
236. Id. at *3 (noting that a jailhouse snitch’s “statement that he talked
with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same job in
the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning
job”).
237. Ashley v. State, 439 S.E.2d 914, 915–16 (Ga. 1994).
238
Id. at 916.
239. As the court noted on appeal:
230

During defense counsel's cross-examination of Bates, the
witness admitted that he had previously given police
officers false information about the case; that he had
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conducting extensive postconviction hearings, Ashley’s lawyers put
on extensive evidence that Bates was mentally ill and had fabricated
his trial testimony.240
At the conclusion of the hearing on the matter, the judge summed
up his thoughts on the matter:
At the trial I thought Donald Bates was lying. Now I
think Donald Bates is lying on the trial, but I do not
think that affects the verdict in the case . . . I just don’t
believe prisoners who testify against prisoners to get
out of jail. And I don’t think juries do either. I didn’t
believe it then; I don’t believe it now. I don’t think that
you’ve proved anything about what the truth is, either.
I don’t think it was what Mr. Bates swore it was and I
don’t think we know.241
Despite conceding that one of the main witnesses at Ashley’s trial
was an untrustworthy witness and a blatant liar, the trial court
denied Ashley’s motion for a new trial, based entirely, it appears, on
the judge’s conviction that the snitch’s testimony was so obviously
perjured that members of the jury must have realized it.242 In so
ruling, the judge failed to take into account several factors that might
have led a jury to give such testimony credence at trial, including that
Mr. Bates was the State’s witness whose credibility was defended by
the prosecutor, that the judge himself had permitted the witness to
testify in the first place, and that the jury’s verdict itself belied his
conclusion. In any event, the court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.243

been convicted six times for forgery; that he had just been
released from the mental health unit of a state
correctional institution; and that he had mental health
problems and was being treated with Prozac. Defense
counsel sought to present testimony from an assistant
district attorney that, in another murder case, Bates had
given authorities false information concerning the
identity of the perpetrator in exchange for favorable
treatment from the authorities. The trial court refused
to allow the evidence after sustaining the State's
objection that it was irrelevant and collateral.
Id.
Brief of Appellant, Ashley v. State, 439 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 1994) (No.
S93A1989),1993 WL 13035276, at *24–25.
241. Id.
242
Id.
243
Ashley, 439 S.E.2d at 917.
240
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Ashley served twenty years in a Georgia prison, and was released on
parole on January 31, 2012.244
What is worse, even in cases where jailhouse snitches come
forward and admit that they lied at trial, courts rarely grant
defendants postconviction relief.245 This happened, for instance, in
the Troy Davis case.246 Five years after jailhouse snitch Kevin
McQueen testified that Davis confessed to shooting police officer
Mark McPhail, McQueen executed an affidavit recanting his trial
testimony.247 In the affidavit, McQueen explained that he had heard
details of the Davis case on television and from other inmates, and he
had then contacted the detective in charge of the investigation.248 He
falsely told the detective that Davis had confessed to him and
repeated the story at trial.249 He also admitted that the charges
against him had been dropped or reduced as a reward for his
testimony, a fact that he also lied about at trial.250
McQueen’s recantation was presented to numerous courts during
the approximately twenty years that Davis sought to prove that he
was actually innocent of the murder of the Savannah police officer.251
Because Davis was deemed to have procedurally defaulted most of his
legal claims, few courts even addressed the significance of McQueen’s
recantation.252 When a judge finally did consider the significance of
the recantation in a habeas hearing conducted to evaluate Davis’s
actual innocence claim, the judge rejected it as insignificant.253
According to the judge, McQueen’s trial testimony was so patently
false that the jury must have been aware of the fact at trial.254
Therefore, the judge concluded, McQueen’s recantation was both

244

Parole Database, GA. ST. BOARD. PARDONS & PAROLES (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.pap.state.ga.us/ParoleeDatabase/ (search “Inmate Number” for
“219088”).
245
See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Convictions Based on Lies: Defining Due
Process Protection, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 331 (2011).
246
Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 358–59 (Ga. 2008) (affirming a denial of a
motion for a new trial despite recantations by several prosecution witnesses).
247
In re Davis, No. CV409–130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *48 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010).
248
Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 36–37, In re Davis, No. 09CV00130, 2010
WL 8032222 (S.D. Ga. June 23, 2010).
249. Id. at 27–30.
250. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *48.
251
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Davis v. State, (Ga. 2008) (No.
08-6), 2008 WL 4366181 (presenting McQueen’s recantations as a reason for the
Supreme Court of Georgia to reconsider Davis’s conviction).
252
See, e.g., Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129, 134 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Davis
had procedurally defaulted on his constitutional claims by failing to raise them on
direct appeal).
253
Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *54.
254
Id.
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plainly true and inconsequential.255 Davis’ habeas petition was
denied, and Davis was subsequently executed.256
Although it took twenty years, a better result was obtained by
Bobby Joe Maxwell. Maxwell had been convicted in 1992—largely on
the testimony of infamous jailhouse snitch Sidney Storch—of
committing several murders attributed to the “Skid Row Stabber.”257
Based on extensive evidence, including the testimony given by Storch
to the Los Angeles County grand jury, that Storch was a serial
perjurer who had made a living concocting false jailhouse confessions,
the Ninth Circuit granted Maxwell’s habeas petition in 2012.258 Even
then, however, the Ninth Circuit was forced to expressly overrule
factual findings made by the California Superior Court, which had
concluded, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of Storch’s
“pattern of perjury,” that there was no basis in the Maxwell case itself
to find that Storch’s testimony was false.259
California sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
which was denied over the dissents of Justices Scalia and Alito.260
Justice Scalia complained that, at best, “the evidence relied on by the
Ninth Circuit might permit, but by no means compels, the conclusion
that Storch fabricated Maxwell’s admission.”261 This, Scalia argued,
was an insufficient basis upon which to grant habeas relief.262
Writing in support of the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice
Sotomayor responded:
The dissent labels all of this evidence “circumstantial.”
It insists that it is possible that Storch repeatedly
falsely implicated other defendants, and fabricated
other material facts at Maxwell’s trial, but
uncharacteristically told the truth about Maxwell’s
supposed confession. Of course, that is possible. But
it is not reasonable, given the voluminous evidence
that Storch was a habitual liar who even the State
concedes told other material lies at Maxwell’s trial.263
Maxwell’s case does demonstrate that postconviction relief for
some victims of false jailhouse testimony is possible, but it is the
exception that proves the rule. The evidence of Storch’s misconduct
255

Id. at *60.
Id. at *61; Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1.
257. Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 2010).
258
Id. at 513.
259. Id. at 504–05.
260
Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 613 (2012).
261. Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262
Id. at 615.
263. Id. at 612 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
256
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was overwhelming, and Maxwell’s victory seemingly grudging.
Plainly, postconviction relief for defendants convicted on the basis of
unreliable or false snitch testimony is technically available but
practically attainable only in extreme cases, and even then only over
spirited opposition. As the state court rulings in Maxwell’s case
illustrate, busy and jaded state appellate courts typically look the
other way in the presence of even blatant evidence that jailhouse
snitches lied at a criminal defendant’s trial, and sentiment in favor of
upholding those determinations exists in some quarters all the way
up the judicial chain of command.264
This anecdotal evidence is supported by more systematic
research. Professor Brandon Garrett conducted a study of the first
200 DNA exonerations.265 In those cases, Garrett found that jailhouse
informant testimony had been a factor in 11.5 percent of the cases.266
Jailhouse informants provided testimony in forty-three percent of the
capital cases that ultimately ended in exoneration.267 Strikingly, not
one of those wrongly convicted defendants attempted to challenge
their convictions based on a claim that the jailhouse informant had
fabricated testimony, likely, as Garrett surmises, “because they could
not locate any evidence to prove that the informants testified
falsely.”268 Reviewing the record of relief granted in cases involving
false jailhouse snitch testimony, it is abundantly clear that wrongly
convicted defendants cannot rely on postconviction processes for
relief. As Anne Bowen Poulin has argued, “When false testimony is
given at trial the truth finding process is fundamentally corrupted.”269
The courts’ routine failure to grant relief to defendants who establish
that jailhouse snitches presented false testimony at trial deserves
prompt and effective relief, but such relief, sadly, for most has simply
not been forthcoming.
IV.REGULATION OF JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY SHORT OF ABOLITION
IS CERTAIN TO BE INEFFECTIVE
A wide variety of commentators have condemned jailhouse snitch
testimony for many of the reasons noted here.270 They have proposed

264. But see, e.g., Ex Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014) (denying habeas relief despite false witness testimony on the
grounds that said testimony was immaterial to the verdict).
265
Garrett, supra note 210, at 64.
266.Id. at 86.
267.Id. at 93.
268.Id. at 86–87.
269.Poulin, supra note 245, at 334.
270. See, e.g., THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 15; Alexandra
Natapoff, Comment, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to
Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 107–29
(2006); David Protess, A Tale of Two Snitches, THE HUFFINGTON
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a variety of reforms, including enhanced disclosure requirements to
ensure vigorous cross-examination of jailhouse informants, pretrial
reliability hearings, special jury instructions, using experts to
educate the jury about the effect of incentives on the reliability of
testimony, and heightened corroboration requirements.271 Few,
however, have vigorously called for an outright ban on use of
electronically uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony.272 As I
argue here, however, nothing less than a total ban on such testimony
will be effective.
A. Pretrial Reliability Hearings Are Unlikely To Adequately
Screen Out Lying Jailhouse Snitches.
Some commentators have proposed conducting pretrial reliability
hearings to screen out unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony.273
Leading snitch expert Alexandra Natapoff, for example, urges courts
to conduct pretrial reliability hearings for all informant witnesses,
including jailhouse snitches that the government intends to present
at trial.274 In such hearings, the government would have the burden
to demonstrate “the reliability of any informant witness, or
statements made by that informant.”275 Moreover, as she points out,
at least three states have already established pretrial reliability
hearings for jailhouse snitches.276 Proponents argue that such
hearings fall well within the comfort zone of trial courts, which
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-protess/reynaldoguevara_b_3397012.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2013, 5:12 AM).
271. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192–99; Harris, supra note 78,
at 49–58.
272. The authors of a 2007 PEW Charitable Trust study on jailhouse
snitches, for instance, condemned their use but advocated a set of
reforms, including corroboration, “pretrial disclosures, reliability
hearings, and special jury instructions” instead of a categorical ban. THE
JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2. Rory Little has urged a categorical
exclusion of six types of unreliable evidence most frequently linked to
wrongful convictions, including jailhouse informant testimony, in capital
cases. See Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful
Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37
SW. U. L. REV. 965, 968–69 (2008). Other occasional calls for a total ban
have been made. See, e.g., Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 20, 78 (2003) (“The best way to deal with
perjured testimony is to exclude it, and in light of the evidence that
testimony from a jailhouse informant is so often false, it, too, should be
subject to exclusion.”).
273. See, e.g., DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 157; Harris, supra note 78,
at 61–62.
274. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 194.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 194–95 (identifying Illinois, Oklahoma, and Nevada as
mandating pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse informant
testimony); see D’Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1991); Dodd
v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
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regularly are asked to screen other types of evidence, such as
scientific evidence and expert witness testimony, for reliability.277
Professor George Harris has also proposed that courts undertake
extensive pretrial reliability hearings of any compensated witness,
including jailhouse snitches.278 Harris suggests that evidence at such
hearings would include anything relevant to the witness’s credibility,
including the “nature of compensation that the witness has received
or may receive,” the witness’s history of cooperation in other cases,
and physical or other evidence “unknown to the witness at the time
of her initial proffer of testimony, that is consistent with or
contradicts the cooperator’s testimony” in specific and unanticipated
ways.279 “Changed testimony, a history of repeated cooperation for
compensation, compensation out of proportion to the government’s
legitimate interest in the prosecution of the defendant, or overtly
contingent compensation should create a presumption of insufficient
reliability that the moving party would have to overcome.”280
Although adoption of a pretrial reliability screening requirement
would not be a bad thing, and might even be moderately helpful, the
proposed pretrial reliability screenings would certainly not be a
panacea. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that trial courts have
the ability or inclination to screen out false jailhouse snitch testimony
in the mine run of cases.
For starters, judges are unlikely to be any better than jurors at
distinguishing lying witnesses from honest ones.281 Numerous
studies have examined the extent to which training and expertise
improves one’s ability to assess whether others are telling the
truth.282 Police officers in particular have been the focus of many of
these studies because they regularly interview suspects and evaluate
the credibility of the stories they are told.283 Without exception, those
studies have found that “people are poor intuitive judges of truth and
deception, and that police investigators and other so-called experts
277. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 195; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–90 (1993).
278. Harris, supra note 78, at 63–64.
279. Id. at 63.
280. Id. at 64–65.
281. See, e.g., Schauer & Spellman, supra note 178, at 19 (noting the
“mistaken belief that judges and juries are competent evaluators of the
veracity of those who are offering [direct evidence] testimony”).
282. Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I'm Innocent!”: Effects of
Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation
Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501 (1999) (internal citations
omitted); see also Gary D. Bond, Deception Detection Expertise, 32 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 339, 339 (2008) (citing research studies finding that
subjects were generally unable to identify lies at a rate greater than
chance).
283. See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”:
Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 471 (2002).
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who routinely make such judgments are also highly prone to error.”284
Indeed, some studies indicate that specialized training might make
interviewers more likely to misinterpret the truthfulness of the
interviewee and to increase the interviewer’s confidence in those
misjudgments.285 If police investigators—who often receive special
training in interrogation skills and lie detection—have not
demonstrated any measurable advantage in detecting deception,
there is little reason to believe judges—who deal with individuals at
far greater remove—have developed any better abilities.
Like police officers, judges actually might be more poorly
equipped than jurors to fairly evaluate the credibility of a jailhouse
snitch’s incriminating testimony, and confirmation bias again may be
the culprit. Research on judge and juror perceptions of guilt indicates
that judges are more likely to view criminal defendants as guilty than
jurors.286 In Kalven and Zeisel’s classic study of jury behavior, for
example, the researchers found that judges were consistently more
likely than juries to vote to convict.287 Other researchers have found
“similar patterns of trial judges unduly leaning in the prosecution’s
favor when appraising the evidence.”288 Due to the volume of
apparently guilty criminal defendants that judges see regularly in
their courtrooms, judges may similarly be more strongly disinclined
to question the accuracy of the jailhouse snitch’s testimony, which
confirms what the judge likely assumes anyway: that the defendant
is guilty.
Pro-prosecution bias by judges has been frequently noted in other
contexts as well. For instance, judicial tolerance of police perjury is
widely acknowledged.289 Courts know that police frequently lie but
tend to look the other way.290 A variety of scholars have concluded
that trial judges “habitually accept[] the policeman’s word” and may
even ignore police lies “to prevent the suppression of evidence and

284. Kassin & Fong, supra note 282, at 500–01; see also Bella M. DePaulo
et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception,
1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 346 (1997).
285. DePaulo et al., supra note 284.
286. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
55–59 (Phoenix ed., 1971); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz,
Reflections On Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of
Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 562–63
(1998).
287. KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 286; see also Guggenheim &
Hertz, supra note 286 (discussing research).
288. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286, at 568.
289. Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for Judging
Police by a More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259,
267–68 (2010).
290. Id. at 267 (citing studies that conclude judges “knowingly
acquiesce in police perjury so that they too avoid letting a guilty
defendant escape prosecution”).
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assure conviction.”291 At least one research study lends empirical
credence to that hypothesis.292 One commentator summarized the
most frequently advanced explanations for why judges so frequently
fail to crack down on police perjury:
1) it is impossible to determine if a witness is lying; 2)
judges dislike the possibility of suppressing evidence
due to police perjury; 3) many judges believe that most
defendants in the system are guilty; 4) judges are more
likely to believe an officer’s testimony rather than the
defendant’s; and 5) judges do not enjoy accusing other
government officials of lying.293
The reasons judges are reluctant to make credibility
determinations against police are also applicable to jailhouse snitches
in that adverse credibility findings might also impugn the motives or
integrity of the prosecutors who put the snitches on the witness stand.
In many cases there will be little external basis on which to assess
the credibility of a jailhouse snitch’s testimony. Because of proprosecution bias, judges may be more inclined to permit prosecutors
to put on potentially unreliable evidence, particularly because such
evidence confirms the possible judicial assumption that most
defendants are, in fact, guilty. While judges are unlikely to be
inclined to specially credit an inmate’s testimony under most
circumstances, they may be more willing to credit such testimony
where it has been previously vetted—or at least apparently vetted—
by law enforcement officials. Finally, just as judges are often
reluctant to accuse police officers of lying, they probably are also
reluctant to make an adverse credibility determination against a
witness for whom the prosecutor has—expressly or implicitly—
personally vouched. After all, a judicial determination that such a
witness is lying at minimum suggests that the prosecutor who put
that witness on the stand was negligent in proffering the evidence,
and could even imply that the prosecutor knowingly attempted to use
false testimony.
That judges tend, for whatever reason, to be biased when
assessing the admissibility of evidence is further supported by the
judicial track record in screening scientific evidence. As Professor
Suzanne Rozelle has argued, a study of evidentiary challenges in
criminal cases reveals a clear pattern of pro-prosecution admissibility
291. Id. at 265.
292. Id. at 264–65 (studying judicial resolution of claims of police perjury
brought by criminal defendants).
293. See Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall
of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 211, 222 (2000) (summarizing reasons that judges are
reluctant to find police perjury).
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rulings.294 Courts readily admit all sorts of questionable forensic
“match” evidence proffered by prosecutors, including tool mark, bite
mark, footprint, and handwriting comparisons, that lack any
scientific foundation regarding the reliability of the method or the
proficiency of the analyst.295 At the same time, those same courts
routinely deny defendants’ requests to put on expert witnesses to
testify about the known unreliability of that evidence, even where
such testimony is grounded in empirical research.296 This proprosecution bias strongly suggests that judges will conduct pretrial
reliability screenings of jailhouse snitch testimony in the same onesided manner.
In sum, most judges’ laissez-faire attitudes about state witnesses
provides little reason to expect that if given the opportunity to
conduct pretrial hearings, judges will suddenly crack down on
unreliable jailhouse snitches.
B. Disclosure of Impeachment Material
A small number of states require prosecutors to comply with
enhanced disclosure obligations in certain types of cases involving
jailhouse informants.297 As a result of recent reforms, for example,
Illinois prosecutors must now disclose a substantial amount of
information about informants, including any benefit promised to the
informant in exchange for testimony, the circumstances in which the
defendant’s alleged confession supposedly occurred, names of
witnesses present at the time, and the informant’s prior history of
cooperation with the State.298 Oklahoma and Nebraska also require
enhanced pretrial disclosure.299 Oklahoma’s Court of Criminal
Appeals recently established disclosure rules applicable to jailhouse
snitch testimony in all cases.300 According to the Oklahoma Court, at
least ten days prior to trial the State must disclose the informant’s
criminal history, any deal or promise extended to the informant, the
circumstances in which the admission or confession was obtained,
other cases in which the informant has testified and any benefits
received as a result, any statements recanting his statement or
testimony, and any other information relevant to the informant’s
credibility.301 This impeachment evidence is undoubtedly necessary
to permit defense counsel to better cross-examine informants. For

294. See Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants
and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 606 (2007).
295. Id. at 599–600.
296. Id.
297
GARRETT, supra note 1, at 256.
298. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 115-21(c) (1993).
299
NATAPOFF, supra note 3.
300. See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
301. Id.
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these reasons, numerous commentators have called for increased
disclosure obligations along similar lines.302
There may, however, be inherent limits on the extent to which
disclosure rules can mitigate the likely prejudice resulting from
admission of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony. First, no matter
how scathing the impeachment, jurors all begin with the knowledge
that jailhouse snitches are convicted criminals. Notwithstanding
that knowledge, jurors routinely believe snitch testimony anyway.
Second, as George Harris has noted, most of the critical details
surrounding a jailhouse informant’s testimony, including how the
government “selects, prepares, and evaluates” such witnesses, are
“undiscoverable,” and “[e]ven that which is discoverable often
remains resistant to realistic portrayal at trial.”303 More likely,
however, the critical information will simply never be uncovered.
“Given the secrecy surrounding the prosecutor’s preparation of her
witnesses and the inability to review the process meaningfully, it is
virtually impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent
witnesses have been coached by prosecutors and police to give false or
misleading testimony.”304 In addition, many types of benefits that
prosecutors can bestow on jailhouse informants—such as a promise
not to bring future charges or to bring lesser charges rather than
greater charges—are protected under the guise of prosecutorial
discretion and insulated from discovery.305
There are additional reasons why enhanced discovery will not
resolve the jailhouse snitch problem. Perhaps most importantly, in
many cases there simply will be little to disclose. When an inmate
comes forward purporting to possess incriminating information, the
State can truthfully claim that it had nothing to do with initiating
contact with the witness. It simply received the evidence that the
witness reported, found it credible, and proffered it at trial. The
fundamental question—whether the informant is truthful or lying—
will remain for the jury to determine. Because no formal deal will
actually have been made in most cases prior to the witness’s in-court
testimony, there also will be nothing to disclose regarding any benefit
or inducement offered by the State in exchange for the testimony.
When questioned about whether the witness has received a benefit,
the witness can honestly state that he has not. He might add, as
witnesses frequently and honestly do, that he hopes the prosecutor or
judge will look favorably upon him in the future as a result of his
302. See NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192; Harris, supra note 78, at 62
(calling for enhanced discovery requirements in cases of all cooperating
witnesses, including electronic recording of all ex parte discussions with
the cooperator).
303. Harris, supra note 78, at 53.
304. Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecutors, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 833 (2002).
305
Harris, supra note 78, at 53.
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testimony, because the prosecutor has never made any explicit
promise to reward him, and because the prosecutor has only asked
him to testify “truthfully” about what he knows.
Enhanced disclosure is an inadequate remedy for another, and
perhaps even more basic, reason. Precisely in those cases in which
jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most sought out, prosecutors
cannot be trusted to fairly and honestly disclose the critical facts that
would undermine the snitch’s testimony.306 If police or prosecutors
have affirmatively provided essential details about a case to a
jailhouse snitch they know to be untrustworthy, have made secret
promises to reward witnesses for their testimony in the future, or
have recruited the snitch—in violation of the Sixth Amendment—to
affirmatively elicit incriminating information against a fellow
inmate, then no formal disclosure requirement will induce the
prosecutor to disclose such damning information.
Finally, even if a disclosure requirement did result in discovery
of important impeachment evidence that defense counsel could use at
trial to impeach the witness, it is not clear that witness impeachment
alone is sufficient to blunt the prejudice caused by testimony that the
defendant has confessed to the crime. As discussed above, research
suggests that while jurors have the capacity to recognize that some
witnesses are more self-interested than others, such information does
not necessarily get processed in a way that helps defendants. Due to
the stickiness of fundamental attribution error, jurors are still more
likely to vote to convict, particularly in close cases, after hearing even
tainted and objectively unreliable confession evidence.
C. Corroboration
Another suggestion made by commentators is to apply
heightened corroboration requirements to jailhouse snitch
testimony.307 Indeed, the American Bar Association passed a
resolution “calling on federal, state, and local governments to adopt
measures so ‘no prosecution should occur based solely upon
uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony.’”308
These
306. As one commentator noted, “[t]he likelihood of fabrication
resulting from bargained-for testimony is simply too great to rely on a
prosecutor's honor and good faith in meeting his discovery obligations”
with respect to incentivized witnesses. Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1176.
307. Cf. Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for
Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 798 (1990) (arguing
that corroboration requirements should apply for all compensated
informants).
308. See ABA Res. 108(b), adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 15, 2005),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/hous
e_of_delegates/108b_2011_my.authcheckdam.pdf.
Defendants have
argued for adoption of corroboration requirements unsuccessfully in
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recommendations recently have been implemented in a few states,
including Texas309 and California,310 which have enacted legislation
to require corroboration of jailhouse informants’ testimony.311
Jailhouse snitch corroboration requirements are often modeled
on similar corroboration requirements for accomplice testimony.312
While these reforms are laudable for what they are worth, they
simply are not worth that much. The main problem with a
corroboration requirement is that, as typically formulated, it is too
lax. Under Texas law, for example, “all that is required is that there
be some evidence—other than the jailhouse informant’s testimony—
which tends to connect the accused to the commission of the
offense.”313 California’s requirement is somewhat more stringent. In
California, it is not enough if the corroborating evidence merely
“tends to connect” the defendant to the crime.314 Rather, the
corroborating evidence must, in fact, “connect[] the defendant with
the commission of the offense.”315 Accomplice testimony, however,
can be corroborated by jailhouse snitch testimony, and vice versa,
substantially weakening the protective value of the corroboration
requirement.316
Jailhouse snitches can also presumably be
corroborated by other jailhouse snitches.317

some states. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 82 A.3d 630, 635 (Conn. App. Ct.
2013); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE:
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 63 (Paul C. Giannelli &
Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (urging reforms of state rules regarding
jailhouse informants).
309. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2014).
310. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (Deering 2008).
311
Id. (“The testimony of an in-custody informant shall be corroborated by other
evidence that connects the defendant with the commission of the offense, the
special circumstance, or the evidence offered in aggravation to which the incustody informant testifies.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (“A
defendant may not be convicted of an offense on the testimony of a person . . .
imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the
testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the offense committed.”).
312
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5, with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111
(Deering 2008).
313. Hernandez v. State, No. 03-10-00863-CR, 2013 WL 3723203, at *4
(Tex. App. July 11, 2013); see also Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994).
314
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.
315. Id.; see People v. Davis, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1490 (2013).
316. See, e.g., People v. Washington, Nos. A118349, A123088, 2009 WL
714512, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009) (citing People v. Williams, 940
P.2d 710, 772 (Cal. 1997)); Ramirez v. State, 754 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ga.
2014).
317. See, e.g., Whitley v. Ercole, 725 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(affirming conviction based on testimony of jailhouse informant where
informant’s testimony was corroborated by other jailhouse informants).
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Other states rely on the “corpus delicti” rule to enforce a more
modest corroboration requirement. In Tennessee, for instance, “the
corpus delicti of a crime may not be established by a confession
alone.”318 Accordingly, a conviction may not be sustained if the only
evidence in the case is testimony by a jailhouse informant. The corpus
delicti rule, however, provides even weaker protection against lying
jailhouse snitches. In Tennessee, for example, as long as the
prosecutor can prove that a crime in fact occurred, the corpus delicti
rule will not bar the State from relying solely on jailhouse informant
testimony to establish that a particular individual was the crime’s
perpetrator.319
Even where the corroboration requirement has some teeth, it will
rarely make much of a difference. In the vast majority of cases in
which jailhouse snitch testimony is sought, there will be at least some
other evidence implicating the defendant.320 In those cases, however,
prosecutors want to use the jailhouse snitches for precisely the reason
that they should not be allowed to do so: the other evidence in the case
is weak or equivocal, making the jailhouse snitch testimony unduly
influential in determining the outcome of the case.321 After all, there
is no reason to use jailhouse snitch testimony—and to reward
convicted criminals for providing it—if the State has sufficient other
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only in cases
where the prosecutor believes there to be a real risk of acquittal that
the prosecutor will be willing to “pay” the price for such testimony.322
318. State v. Churchwell, No. M2011-00950-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL
430118, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2013) (citing Ashby v. State, 139
S.W. 872 (1911)).
319. See id. (holding that the bodies of shooting victims established
that a criminal offense had occurred, and therefore the corpus delicti rule
was not violated by admission of a jailhouse informant testimony that
the defendant confessed to the crime). Connecticut makes corroboration
of a jailhouse snitch’s testimony a factor in determining whether a failure
to instruct the jury about the potential unreliability of a jailhouse
informant was harmless error. See State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17, 29 (Conn.
2009); State v. Arroyo, 973 A.2d 1254, 1262–63 (Conn. 2009).
320
Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are
Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a
Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 551–52 (2009).
321
Id.
322. At the same time, cases in which the only evidence against a
defendant is jailhouse snitch testimony—though they certainly exist—
are likely to be highly disfavored by prosecutors. After all, even jurors
prone to be misled by fundamental attribution error will be hard-pressed
to convict a defendant where there is absolutely no other evidence of guilt
than the uncorroborated say-so of a single jailhouse snitch. I say a single
snitch here advisedly, because in California, at least, jailhouse snitch
testimony provided by two different snitches will satisfy the
corroboration requirement, as long as the snitches did not have an
opportunity to conspire among themselves. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1111.5 (Deering 2008).
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These corroboration rules do little to prevent wrongful
convictions from occurring in the types of cases in which jailhouse
snitches are typically used. Prosecutors will rarely move forward in
cases where there is no evidence at all connecting a defendant to a
charged crime, and as long as there is some other evidence, even if it
is quite weak, then the corroboration requirement will not prevent
the snitch’s testimony from coming in.
Perhaps a truly robust corroboration rule would make a
difference. For instance, reliability would not be a significant problem
under a rule that permitted jailhouse snitch testimony to come in only
if the alleged confession made to the snitch had been electronically
recorded. In that case, the snitch’s testimony would be corroborated
by the taped recording of the conversation. Of course, such a rule
would raise other problems—most significantly, Sixth Amendment
concerns—that would preclude snitches from being used to secretly
record confessions by other inmates in most cases.323
Given the substantial concerns, however, that police officers and
prosecutors might provide jailhouse informants with crucial details
about the investigation—inadvertently or otherwise—even a strong
corroboration requirement that did not actually require electronic
recording would fail to provide sufficient protection. First, there is
documented evidence that law enforcement agents have provided
informants with incriminating details in some cases.324 More
generally, research on false confessions demonstrates that even police
officers and prosecutors acting entirely in good faith can, and have,
inadvertently revealed supposedly secret details to interrogated
suspects during the course of interrogation.325 Judges and juries then
concluded that those confessions were reliable precisely because they
included details about which only the perpetrator of the crime
supposedly could know.326 Corroboration of the “details” of the
suspect’s confession, in these cases, actually served to bolster the false
confessions.327 Courts uniformly emphasized that these confessions

323. The Sixth Amendment bars the State from “deliberately eliciting”—
either directly or through its agents—incriminating statements from
criminal defendants. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986);
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980). However, the
prohibition only applies with respect to crimes as to which the defendant
has been charged. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 163 (2001).
324. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27–28.
325 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1051, 1053 (2010).
326. Id. at 1113 (examining dozens of exonerations involving false
confessions and finding that “[i]n many cases . . . police likely disclosed
[critical] details during interrogations by telling exonerees how the crime
happened”).
327
Id. at 1118.
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contained admissions that only the true murderer or rapist could
have known.328
While recording the entirety of the interrogation might have
revealed the source of contamination, anything less only further
cemented its persuasiveness.329 The same dynamic almost certainly
would be at work in cases involving jailhouse snitches. A mandatory
requirement that all conversations between a snitch and state agents
be recorded, as some commentators have urged,330 would address
some aspects of the problem, but given the variety of possible sources
of information from which a jailhouse snitch can potentially draw,
only a tape recording of the defendant’s actual confession to the snitch
would adequately ensure that the snitch’s testimony was reliable.
D. Jury instructions
Commentators have also called for juries to be instructed about
the special reliability concerns present when jailhouse informants
testify.331 A few states have adopted such requirements.332 While
requiring special jury instructions is harmless, it is, like the other
measures discussed above, almost certainly an insufficient remedy.
The problems with jury instructions are well documented. A wealth
of data suggests that jury instructions are generally ineffective tools
for channeling a juror’s assessment of evidence presented at trial.333
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 1, at 247. Some jurisdictions already
require such procedures. In Los Angeles County, for example, “the
District Attorney's office . . . requires tape-recording of all interviews with
jailhouse informants and preservation of these recordings, as well as any
other records of interaction and use of jailhouse informants.” Handy,
supra note 29, at 760; see also Gershman, supra note 304, at 861–62;
Mosteller, supra note 320, at 560–61, 560 n.193.
331. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 197.
332. California is one such state. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a(b) (West
2004) (requiring courts to instruct the jury on in-custody informant
testimony). Other states include Montana and Oklahoma, which require
special jury instructions on informant credibility when a jailhouse
informant testifies. See State v. Grimes, 982 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Mont.
1999); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). Some
states require cautionary jury instructions only where a jailhouse
informant’s testimony lacks corroboration. See People v. Petschow, 119
P.3d 495, 504 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. James, No. 96-CA-17, 1998 WL
518135, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1998); State v. Spiller, No. 00-2897CR, 2001 WL 1035213, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2001).
333. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some
Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon
an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 91–95 (1972) (finding that mock jurors who
learned of a defendant’s prior convictions were more likely to convict
regardless of whether they received instructions to disregard the prior
convictions). But see David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and
the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 423–39 (2013) (reviewing
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First, jurors generally are poor at understanding traditional jury
instructions or applying those instructions in deliberations.334
Second, studies using mock jurors have consistently shown that
instructions to disregard relevant evidence do not prevent jurors from
incorporating that evidence into deliberations.335 Studies of the
efficacy of cautionary instructions are also at best mixed.336 There is
thus substantial reason to doubt that such instructions will prove
effective in inoculating jurors after exposure to false jailhouse snitch
testimony.
Indeed, like with unreliable confession evidence
generally, it is far more likely that such instructions “occur too late in
the process to undo the damage” once the testimony “has entered the
stream of evidence at trial.”337 Where evidence as potentially
prejudicial as a reported postcrime confession is at issue, cautionary
jury instructions—while undoubtedly better than nothing—are
simply inadequate to ensure that innocent criminal defendants
receive a fair trial.
There is, in short, no reason to believe that jury instructions are
an effective tool to neutralize the impact of highly prejudicial false
snitch testimony. Relying on jury instructions to redress the harm
inflicted from false jailhouse snitch testimony is like applying a BandAid to a gunshot wound. It merely obscures the problem.

empirical studies and concluding that “evidentiary instructions work,
albeit imperfectly”).
334. Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the
Application of “Plain-Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643,
645 (2013) (reporting that “studies have almost universally returned
results finding that, by and large, jurors are confused by jury instructions
and often disregard them”).
335. See, e.g., Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and
Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 280,
291 (1983) (reporting that mock jurors presented with inadmissible
evidence were more likely to convict than jurors not presented with the
evidence notwithstanding judicial instructions to disregard it); Lisa
Eichorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to
Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 347 (1989); Saul Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers,
Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury:
Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046 (1997) (finding that mock jurors exposed to
incriminating evidence were more likely to view the defendant as guilty
than jurors not exposed to that evidence notwithstanding instructions to
ignore it).
336. Cindy E. Laub et al., Can the Courts Tell an Ear From an Eye? Legal
Approaches to Voice Identification Evidence, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
119, 156 (2013) (evaluating research on cautionary instructions
regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony); see also Sklansky,
supra note 333, at 429.
337. Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession
Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent
Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 823 (2013).
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Indeed, even if all of the above requirements were in place, there
would still be no reason for confidence that false jailhouse snitch
testimony might not be admitted and relied upon by jurors to convict
innocent defendants. Observations made by scholars writing about a
similar problem—the admissibility of unreliable expert forensic
witness testimony—apply equally to jailhouse snitch testimony:
“Experimental research . . . reinforces the need for incriminating []
evidence to be reliable because the various trial safeguards, along
with lay jurors, trial, and appellate judges, have not performed well
in response to prosecutions and convictions incorporating unreliable
[] evidence.”338
Jailhouse snitch testimony is fundamentally and pervasively
unreliable. Its use poses an irremediable threat of taint in criminal
cases.
E. ABOLITION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Abolition of jailhouse snitch testimony is perhaps a radical
suggestion. After all, courts are extremely reluctant to bar use of
relevant evidence in general, and even more so to exclude an entire
class of potentially material evidence altogether. Nonetheless, there
is precedent for such a ban. Indeed, several types of evidence are now
considered so lacking in reliability that they are flatly banned as
admissible in-court evidence. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that
nothing less than a total ban can protect innocent criminal
defendants from the substantial risk of wrongful conviction as a
result of the use, and abuse, of jailhouse snitch testimony.
A. Constitutional precedents: coerced confessions
Coerced confessions are the paradigmatic example of a type of
evidence that has been barred as a matter of law from use in criminal
trials.339 Although there are constitutional considerations at play in
the taking as well as the use of coerced confessions, the ban on the
use of coerced confessions can be traced, in substantial measure, to
the inherent unreliability of such evidence.340
The voluntary confession requirement is a longstanding commonlaw evidence rule that ultimately took on constitutional significance
in the United States.341 The rule is premised on the presumption that
freely made confessions are strongly reliable, but that confessions
338. Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the
Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical Evidence, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 343, 366–67 (2011).
339
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964).
340. Id. at 386 (1964).
341
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574 (1884).
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induced through promises or threats lack such indicia of reliability.342
The Arizona v. Fulminante case reflects the Supreme Court’s most
recent recognition of both the inherent unreliability of coerced
confessions and the difficulty of repairing the prejudice done to
defendants when such evidence is erroneously admitted.343 It is
perhaps noteworthy that Fulminante, though widely invoked as a
coerced confessions case, is also a jailhouse snitch case.344 In
Fulminante, the defendant was suspected of killing his eleven-yearold stepdaughter.345
While in jail for an unrelated offense,
Fulminante allegedly made statements to a fellow inmate implicating
him in the killing.346 After the inmate reported the statements to the
FBI, the inmate was instructed to “find out more.”347 As a suspected
child murderer, Fulminante was being threatened by other prisoners
and was deeply concerned for his safety.348 The inmate “offered to
protect Fulminante from his fellow inmates, but told him, ‘You have
to tell me about it,’ you know. I mean, in other words, ‘For me to give
you any help.’”349 Fulminante then allegedly admitted to the inmate
342. As the Supreme Court long ago observed:
But the presumption upon which weight is given to
such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent will
not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an
untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears
to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in
authority, touching the charge preferred, or because
of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such
person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the
accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of
that freedom of will or self-control essential to make
his confession voluntary within the meaning of the
law.
Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
343. 499 U.S. at 296.
344. There was, moreover, some reason to doubt the credibility of
Sarivola, the jailhouse informant. Sarivola was associated with the
Columbo crime family and convicted for loan sharking, extortion, and
illegal debt-collection practices. Brief of Respondent at 11, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1990) (No. 89-839), 2009 WL 507414. He was
also a paid informant for the FBI who received payment for relaying
“incriminating statements from targeted suspects.” Id. On one occasion,
Sarivola produced a fake audio tape containing purportedly
incriminating statements made by another inmate. Id. at 12. He
ultimately admitted that the tape was a “phony,” but the FBI continued
to use his services even after learning of the fraud. Id. at 6–7.
345
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 282.
346
Id. at 283.
347. Id.
348
Id.
349
Id.
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that he had driven his stepdaughter “to the desert on his motorcycle,
where he choked her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for
her life, before shooting her twice in the head.”350
Fulminante moved to suppress the confession on grounds that it
was the product of coercion.351 The trial court denied the motion, and
Fulminante was convicted and sentenced to death.352 The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in
finding that the confession was voluntary and that the error was not
harmless.353 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed.354 All nine justices agreed that use of coerced confession
evidence at trial is per se error.355
“Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the
jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.”
While some statements by a defendant may concern
isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating
only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in
which the defendant discloses the motive for and
means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon
that evidence alone in reaching its decision.356
The Court was divided, however, as to whether admission of a
coerced confession could ever be harmless.357 A five justice majority
held that harmless error analysis was appropriate even in cases
where a coerced confession had improperly been admitted at trial, but
that the error in Fulminante’s case was not harmless.358 Four justices
dissented from the application of harmless error analysis, contending
that such evidence was so inherently prejudicial that no trial in which
such evidence had been presented to a jury could be fair.359
The Court thus emphasized not only that use of coerced
confessions was always constitutionally improper, but that any
harmless error analysis conducted by a court in a case where a
coerced confession had erroneously been admitted required “extreme
caution,” since “the risk that the confession is unreliable” is magnified

350. Id.
351
Id. at 283–84.
352
Id. at 284.
353
Id.
354
Id. at 284–85.
355
Id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 296 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–
40 (White, J., dissenting)).
357
Id. at 288, 295.
358
Id. at 295, 297.
359
Id. at 288–90.

COVEY_FINALAUTHORREAD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

152

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

4/3/2015 2:07 PM

[Vol. XX

by the “profound impact” that confession evidence tends to exert upon
juries.360
Of course, the constitutional ban on involuntary confessions
necessitated by due process considerations is accompanied by the
Fifth Amendment’s ban on compelled self-incriminating testimony.361
That ban has been further expanded under Miranda v. Arizona362 to
preclude government use of virtually all statements obtained by
police during custodial interrogation in a manner inconsistent with
the procedural safeguards established by the Court.363
B. Procedurally Unreliable Hearsay Evidence
A coerced confession is not the only kind of evidence categorically
prohibited from use in criminal trials. The Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause similarly precludes the use, at trial, of a
particular class of evidence, namely, testimonial out-of-court
statements that were either made without prior opportunity for crossexamination or by a currently available declarant.364 The Court’s preCrawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was an express
reflection of the constitutional importance of evidentiary
reliability.365 In Ohio v. Roberts,366 the Court construed the
Confrontation Clause as directed toward the exclusion of out-of-court
statements made by unavailable witnesses that lack “adequate
‘indicia of reliability.’”367 Of course, with Crawford, the Court
reconceptualized
its
Confrontation
Clause
jurisprudence,
downplaying mere evidentiary reliability as the touchstone of
constitutional admissibility of hearsay evidence.368 Instead, the
Court substituted a procedural standard: hearsay evidence was
admissible under the Confrontation Clause only if it was either
nontestimonial, or if testimonial, only if it had previously been subject
to cross-examination.369 Nonetheless, the Court was explicit that the
reliability of evidence was the primary purpose of the Confrontation
Clause:

360. Id. at 296.
361
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
362
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
363. Id. at 460–61.
364. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (holding
that testimonial evidence is only admissible where cross-examination is
unavailable).
365
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
366
Id.
367. Id.
368
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2006).
369. Id. at 53–56.
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To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in
a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.
The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable
evidence (a point on which there could be little
dissent), but about how reliability can best be
determined.370
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause thus represents a
longstanding, and well-recognized, constitutional exclusionary
principle for a class of presumptively unreliable evidence.
Judges also have the ability, although it is one that is
infrequently used, to enforce wholesale exclusions on classes of
evidence deemed insufficiently reliable.371 A court might exclude
jailhouse informant testimony on grounds that admission of such
unreliable evidence violates basic Due Process norms.372
Alternatively, courts might follow the lead established in Jackson
v. Denno373 and impose stricter constitutional regulation on the use of
jailhouse snitch testimony. The defendant in Jackson, Nathan
Jackson, alleged that his murder confession was the product of
coercion.374 Pursuant to New York state procedure, the voluntariness
of Jackson’s confession was submitted, along with all of the other
evidence, to the jury, which was accordingly instructed that if it found
that Jackson’s confession had been coerced, it should ignore it.375
Jackson complained that submission of a coerced confession to the
jury irreparably tainted the case.376 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed,
ruling that questions regarding the voluntariness of confessions must
be adjudicated prior to trial in order, among other things, to ensure
that jurors do not rely on unreliable involuntary confessions to “serve
as makeweights in a compromise verdict,” or to prevent jurors from

370. Id. at 61.
371
See Welsh S. White, Regulating Prison Informers Under the Due Process
Clause, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (1991).
372. Cf. id.; see also Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources
of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital
Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 965, 977 (2009) (citing polygraph evidence as
one longstanding example, and pointing out several categories of
evidence proven unreliable in wrongful conviction cases, such as junk
science).
373. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
374
Id. at 369–70.
375
Id. at 374–75.
376
Id. at 376.
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“accepting the confessions to overcome lingering doubt of guilt
prejudice.”377
The logic underlying an expansion of the Jackson rule to
jailhouse snitch cases is simple. Like involuntary confessions,
jailhouse snitch testimony is patently unreliable. Permitting a snitch
to testify regarding the substance of an alleged confession is little
different from permitting a police officer to testify about an allegedly
coerced confession. The only difference is the identity of the witness—
and few would argue that the credibility of inherently self-interested
felons is greater than that of police officers. Certainly, the logic
undergirding the Jackson rule, at minimum, counsels for mandatory
pretrial reliability hearings for contested jailhouse snitch testimony,
as many commentators have argued and as a few states now require.
But because—unlike presumably uncoerced confessions made to
trained and disinterested law enforcement officers—all jailhouse
confessions are inherently unreliable, it makes far more sense to treat
those alleged confessions like coerced confessions, requiring not
merely that they be screened through pretrial reliability hearings, but
that they be absolutely precluded.378
C. Statutory and Administrative Exclusions
While the federal Constitution bars the use of certain classes of
presumptively unreliable evidence, such as compelled confessions and
statements obtained in violation to the Confrontation Clause, still
other classes of evidence are barred by statute, evidentiary rule, and
administrative practice.379
One familiar example is polygraph evidence. Because of deepseated concerns about its reliability, polygraph evidence has been
banned by statute in many states.380 In virtually every state where

377. Id. at 380 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1956)).
378. Of course, judges might also presumptively exclude such evidence
under Rule 403 on the theory that the probative value of jailhouse snitch
testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. FED. R. EVID. 403.
379. Indeed, the common exclusion of hearsay and character evidence
is based on “the fear that certain kinds of admittedly relevant evidence
will be overvalued by the trier of fact.” Schauer & Spellman, supra note
178, at 3.
380. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-21-701–704 (2009) (holding
inadmissible all “stress evaluation instrument[s] [administered by law
enforcement] to test or question individuals for purpose of determining
and verifying the truth of statements”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West
2011) (“[T]he results of a polygraph examination . . . shall not be admitted
into evidence in any criminal proceeding.”). Such evidence is also
precluded in military court martials pursuant to Military Rule of
Evidence 707, which provides, in relevant part: “(a) Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the
opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take,
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it has not been banned by statute, it has been ruled per se
inadmissible by courts.381 Such bans are appropriate, the Supreme
Court has held, because of the State’s “unquestionably . . . legitimate
interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of
fact in a criminal trial.”382 Indeed, the evidence at issue in the famous
Frye383 case—setting minimum standards for the admissibility of
scientific evidence—was a polygraph test.384 Although the test for
admissibility established in Frye has been replaced by the Daubert
criteria, the ban on polygraph evidence in criminal cases remains
largely—albeit not entirely—intact.385
Other types of evidence have also been deemed sufficiently
unreliable in some jurisdictions that they have been deemed
categorically inadmissible. Visual hair analysis, for example, is “a
kind of evidence so inexact that it is restricted or barred in some
jurisdictions.”386 Other examples include hypnotically refreshed
testimony387 and uncorroborated accomplice testimony.388 (Of course,
all of the flaws of uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and then
some, exist with respect to uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony
as well.) Some law enforcement agencies have taken it upon
themselves to refrain from using or sanctioning the use of certain
types of unreliable evidence. The FBI, for instance, stopped
performing bullet lead analysis after the “National Research Council

failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be
admitted into evidence.” MILITARY COMM’N R. EVID. 707.
381. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998) (affirming
the military’s per se ban on admissibility of polygraph evidence in court
martial proceedings).
382. Id. at 303.
383
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
384. Id. at 1013–14.
385. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation—Polygraph
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1996).
386. James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 2030, 2050 n.84 (2000) (citing Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death
Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at N1).
387. Michael Martin, Admission of Hypnotically Refreshed
Statements, 214 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation,
Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3D 442
(1979).
388. W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Question as to Who Are Accomplices,
Within Rule Requiring Corroboration of Their Testimony, as One of Law
or Fact, 19 A.L.R.2D 1352 (1951); see also M.C.D., Annotation,
Contingency that One May Be Subjected to an Independent Claim or Suit
Depending on Outcome of Action in Which He Is Called as a Witness as a
Disqualifying Interest Within Statutes Disqualifying One Person as
Witness Because of Death of Another, 88 A.L.R. 248 (1934); A.M.
Swartout, Annotation, Statute Disqualifying One Person as Witness
Because of Death of Another as Applicable to Executor or Administrator
of Decedent, 117 A.L.R. 606 (1938).
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concluded that available data did not support expert testimony
linking crime bullets to a particular source.”389
Because of the highly unreliable nature of jailhouse snitch
testimony, state and federal lawmakers and law enforcement
agencies can and should, consistent with the treatment of other forms
of grossly unreliable evidence, ban the use of jailhouse snitch
testimony through legislative or administrative fiat.390
CONCLUSION
Jailhouse snitch testimony is an inherently unreliable type of
evidence. Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating
lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such
testimony will provide them with material benefits, including in
many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges or sentences.
At the same time, false snitch testimony is difficult if not altogether
impossible to impeach. Because such testimony usually pits the word
of two individuals against one another, both of whose credibility is
suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or
weigh the evidence. Moreover, research suggests that jurors
frequently succumb to fundamental attribution error and unwittingly
fail to properly discount the reliability of evidence supplied by biased
and self-interested witnesses. Unreliability concerns are further
magnified because jailhouse snitch testimony is almost exclusively a
species of confession evidence, and ample research demonstrates that
confession evidence is more persuasive to jurors than any other type
of evidence.
Although some jurisdictions have placed a few modest limits on
jailhouse snitch testimony, no jurisdiction has banned such testimony
outright. It continues to be assumed that the traditional tools of trial
procedure—cross-examination and postconviction review—are
adequate to screen out unreliable evidence and safeguard defendants’
rights. These methods, however, are plainly insufficient, as mounting
evidence of wrongful convictions brought about through the use of

389. Laurel Gilbert, Comment, Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate
Defense: Providing for the Appointment of Experts for Indigent
Defendants in Child Death Cases Under Ake v. Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 469, 482 (2013); see FBI Press Release, FBI Laboratory
Announces Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pressreleases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-leadexaminations.
390. A bill to bar the use of informant testimony in all death penalty
cases was proposed by a Texas legislator, but was not enacted. See
Brandi Grissom, Bill Would Restrict Informant Testimony in Death
Cases,
TEX.
TRIB.
(Nov.
28,
2012),
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/11/28/bill-would-restrict-informanttestimony-death-case/.
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false snitch testimony attests. Commentators have urged adoption of
a variety of additional measures intended to bolster the ability of
courts to screen such testimony for reliability, but on closer
examination, none of these suggestions—while on their own terms
marginally helpful—sufficiently mitigates the high risk that false
jailhouse snitch testimony will be admitted and have a material
impact on jury deliberations.
The only effective solution is to flatly preclude the use of such
testimony. The constitutional infrastructure already exists to permit
courts to move in this direction. The Supreme Court’s longstanding
preclusion of coerced confession evidence provides a precedent readily
applicable to confession evidence provided by jailhouse snitches. But
in all likelihood, if change in this area comes, it will be as a result of
legislative resolve to take meaningful steps to reduce wrongful
convictions. There is a mature body of research data that identifies
the primary causes of wrongful convictions. Jailhouse snitch
testimony is at the top of the list. It is low fruit, waiting to be picked.

